Closed Bug 1613765 (CVE-2019-20503) Opened 4 years ago Closed 4 years ago

Cherry-pick recent upstream security fix 1992: usersctp: out-of-bounds reads in sctp_load_addresses_from_init

Categories

(Core :: Networking, defect)

Unspecified
All
defect
Not set
normal

Tracking

()

RESOLVED FIXED
mozilla75
Tracking Status
firefox-esr68 74+ fixed
firefox73 --- wontfix
firefox74 + fixed
firefox75 + fixed

People

(Reporter: jib, Assigned: dminor)

Details

(Keywords: csectype-bounds, sec-moderate, Whiteboard: [post-critsmash-triage][adv-main74+][adv-esr68.6+])

Attachments

(3 files, 1 obsolete file)

Upstream bug is now publicly visible as 90 day disclosure deadline has expired.

Group: core-security → network-core-security

How old is our copy of sctp? I can't find a version in a header file, but seems quite out of date according to https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/netwerk/sctp/sctp_update.log#19

bug 1400563 might have been the last change we made to this code (Sept 2019).

Flags: needinfo?(dminor)

I don't see any recent (post 2018) sctp bugfixes that the Chrome team flagged as security issues:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component%3ABlink%3EWebRTC%20sctp%20type%3DBug-security&can=1&sort=-m

On the other hand these separate libraries are fuzzed and fixed independently and then uplifted to Chrome and sometimes don't communicate all the things that are actually fixed.

(In reply to Daniel Veditz [:dveditz] from comment #3)

How old is our copy of sctp? I can't find a version in a header file, but seems quite out of date according to https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/netwerk/sctp/sctp_update.log#19

bug 1400563 might have been the last change we made to this code (Sept 2019).

I was actually surprised we had updated that recently (2017). I filed Bug 1613889 to track doing a new update, but I'll do the cherry pick here, because we'll need to figure out resourcing and prioritization for doing an update.

Assignee: nobody → dminor
Status: NEW → ASSIGNED
Flags: needinfo?(dminor)

Updates are generally pretty easy for SCTP; I would only update to a known-good version, preferably one also being used by the chrome team.

I can help is needed

Comment on attachment 9125119 [details]
Bug 1613765 - Cherry pick upstream sctp revision 0d166e; r=ng!

Security Approval Request

  • How easily could an exploit be constructed based on the patch?: Unfortunately these patches are already public on the upstream repo so this question is moot.
  • Do comments in the patch, the check-in comment, or tests included in the patch paint a bulls-eye on the security problem?: No
  • Which older supported branches are affected by this flaw?: All
  • If not all supported branches, which bug introduced the flaw?: None
  • Do you have backports for the affected branches?: No
  • If not, how different, hard to create, and risky will they be?: I expect the same patch to apply cleanly.
  • How likely is this patch to cause regressions; how much testing does it need?: Unlikely since these are cherry picks from upstream.
Attachment #9125119 - Flags: sec-approval?
Attachment #9125118 - Flags: sec-approval?

Comment on attachment 9125119 [details]
Bug 1613765 - Cherry pick upstream sctp revision 0d166e; r=ng!

Approved to land and request uplift.

Attachment #9125119 - Flags: sec-approval? → sec-approval+
Attachment #9125118 - Flags: sec-approval? → sec-approval+

Comment on attachment 9125119 [details]
Bug 1613765 - Cherry pick upstream sctp revision 0d166e; r=ng!

Beta/Release Uplift Approval Request

  • User impact if declined: Potential security problems.
  • Is this code covered by automated tests?: Unknown
  • Has the fix been verified in Nightly?: No
  • Needs manual test from QE?: No
  • If yes, steps to reproduce:
  • List of other uplifts needed: None
  • Risk to taking this patch: Low
  • Why is the change risky/not risky? (and alternatives if risky): Low risk, this has already landed upstream.
  • String changes made/needed: None
Attachment #9125119 - Flags: approval-mozilla-beta?
Attachment #9125118 - Flags: approval-mozilla-beta?

Are these patches going to land on m-c also or are we going straight to bug 1613889 there? I think the former is preferable, FWIW.

Flags: needinfo?(dminor)

(In reply to Ryan VanderMeulen [:RyanVM] from comment #12)

Are these patches going to land on m-c also or are we going straight to bug 1613889 there? I think the former is preferable, FWIW.

Sorry, I forgot to land these! Thanks for catching that.

Flags: needinfo?(dminor)

Comment on attachment 9125118 [details]
Bug 1613765 - Cherry pick upstream sctp revision 790a7a2; r=ng!

Fixes a publicly-disclosed sec bug in sctp. Approved for 74.0b5.

Attachment #9125118 - Flags: approval-mozilla-beta? → approval-mozilla-beta+
Attachment #9125119 - Flags: approval-mozilla-beta? → approval-mozilla-beta+

Comment on attachment 9125119 [details]
Bug 1613765 - Cherry pick upstream sctp revision 0d166e; r=ng!

ESR Uplift Approval Request

  • If this is not a sec:{high,crit} bug, please state case for ESR consideration: Fixes publicly disclosed vulnerability in libsctp.
  • User impact if declined: Potential crashes / security problems.
  • Fix Landed on Version: 75
  • Risk to taking this patch: Low
  • Why is the change risky/not risky? (and alternatives if risky): This is a cherry pick of an upstream fix.
  • String or UUID changes made by this patch: None
Flags: needinfo?(dminor)
Attachment #9125119 - Flags: approval-mozilla-esr68?
Attachment #9125118 - Flags: approval-mozilla-esr68?

Comment on attachment 9125118 [details]
Bug 1613765 - Cherry pick upstream sctp revision 790a7a2; r=ng!

Approved for 68.6esr.

Attachment #9125118 - Flags: approval-mozilla-esr68? → approval-mozilla-esr68+
Attachment #9125119 - Flags: approval-mozilla-esr68? → approval-mozilla-esr68+
Flags: qe-verify-
Whiteboard: [post-critsmash-triage]
Whiteboard: [post-critsmash-triage] → [post-critsmash-triage][adv-main74+][adv-esr68.6+]
Attached file advisory.txt
Attachment #9131378 - Attachment is obsolete: true
Alias: CVE-2019-20503
Group: core-security-release
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