Heap use-after-free in [@ nsINode::GetParentNode] via xmlns markup injection in nsContentUtils::CreateContextualFragment and synchronous customized built-in upgrade
Categories
(Core :: DOM: Core & HTML, defect)
Tracking
()
People
(Reporter: bugmon, Assigned: keithamus)
References
Details
(5 keywords, Whiteboard: [adv-main154+r][adv-esr153.1+r][adv-esr140.14+r][adv-esr115.39+r])
Attachments
(6 files, 6 external files, 1 obsolete file)
nsContentUtils::CreateContextualFragment builds the XML fragment-parsing context string by concatenating the raw, unescaped value of xmlns attributes from the context node's ancestor chain into synthesized 'notacustomelement' tags. An attacker-controlled xmlns attribute value containing '"/><p xmlns="..." is="evil-is"/><notacustomelement q="' therefore injects arbitrary extra elements into the parser context, defeating the code's explicit invariant that context elements can never trigger custom element constructors.
The injected element is a customized built-in (<p is="evil-is">). nsXMLContentSink::CreateElement passes FROM_PARSER_NETWORK, so nsContentUtils::NewXULOrHTMLElement takes the synchronous path and runs CustomElementRegistry::Upgrade — executing the author's constructor mid-parse. Unlike DoCustomElementCreate (which throws if the constructed element already has a parent), the Upgrade path performs no post-constructor parent check. The constructor appends this to a detached holder div. Back in nsXMLContentSink::HandleStartElement, parent->AppendChildTo splices the already-parented element into the synthesized context element CTX: nsINode::InsertChildBefore's "no existing parent" invariant is a debug-only MOZ_ASSERT, and Element::BindToTree sees hadParent==true, so it reassigns mParent = CTX WITHOUT NS_ADDREF.
After parsing, CTX is kept alive only by its two legitimate children's owning mParent references. Content JS removes both siblings, dropping CTX's refcount to zero; the cycle collector's FreeSnowWhite destroys CTX while the injected element's raw mParent still points at it. Any ancestor walk (here Node.contains() -> nsINode::IsInclusiveDescendantOf -> GetParentNode) then reads the freed 136-byte DOM-arena allocation. The dangling pointer targets a small, easily reallocatable DOM allocation and is reachable from many raw-pointer consumers (parentNode wrapping, removal writes, ancestor walks), making this an exploitable use-after-free triggerable from ordinary web content with no special configuration.
Build Info
- Branch: main
- Revision: 0ae9827c4d7bc8b28ccbfa58324ded73b68dccf6
- Timestamp: 2026-07-10T07:54:06+00:00
Affected Code
File: dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp, line 6852-6866
if (name->NamespaceEquals(kNameSpaceID_XMLNS)) {
info.mValue->ToString(uriStr);
// really want something like nsXMLContentSerializer::SerializeAttr
tagName.AppendLiteral(" xmlns"); // space important
if (name->GetPrefix()) {
tagName.Append(char16_t(':'));
name->LocalName()->ToString(nameStr);
tagName.Append(nameStr);
} else {
setDefaultNamespace = true;
}
tagName.AppendLiteral(R"(=")");
tagName.Append(uriStr); // <-- raw attacker value, no escaping of '"' '<' '>' '/'
tagName.Append('"');
}
File: parser/htmlparser/nsParser.cpp, line 576-580
for (theIndex = 0; theIndex < theCount; theIndex++) {
theContext.Append('<');
theContext.Append(aTagStack[theCount - theIndex - 1]); // injected markup becomes real tags
theContext.Append('>');
}
File: dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp, line 12128-12143
if (definition->IsCustomBuiltIn()) {
// 4.2. "Set result to the result of creating an element internal..."
if (nodeInfo->NamespaceEquals(kNameSpaceID_XHTML)) {
*aResult =
CreateHTMLElement(*tag, nodeInfo.forget(), aFromParser).take();
} else {
NS_IF_ADDREF(*aResult = nsXULElement::Construct(nodeInfo.forget()));
}
(*aResult)->SetCustomElementData(MakeUnique<CustomElementData>(typeAtom));
if (synchronousCustomElements) { // true: XML sink passes FROM_PARSER_NETWORK
// 4.3. "...Upgrade result using definition."
CustomElementRegistry::Upgrade(*aResult, definition, rv);
// NOTE: no check that the constructor left *aResult unparented
// (contrast DoCustomElementCreate, which throws on element->GetParentNode())
if (rv.MaybeSetPendingException(cx)) {
aes.ReportException();
}
}
File: dom/base/nsINode.cpp, line 2149
MOZ_ASSERT(!aKid->GetParentNode(), "Inserting node that already has parent");
// debug-only: compiled out in release/ASAN-opt builds, so the
// already-parented element is spliced into a second parent's child list
File: dom/base/Element.cpp, line 2931-2951
const bool hadParent = !!GetParentNode();
...
// Now set the parent.
mParent = &aParent;
if (!hadParent && aParent.IsContent()) {
SetParentIsContent(true);
NS_ADDREF(mParent); // skipped: hadParent==true, so mParent = CTX is an unowned raw pointer
}
File: dom/base/nsINode.cpp, line 173-177
bool nsINode::IsInclusiveDescendantOf(const nsINode* aNode) const {
MOZ_ASSERT(aNode, "is descendant of null node");
for (const nsINode* node : InclusiveAncestors(*this)) { // walks raw mParent; reads freed CTX
if (node == aNode) {
return true;
}
Four cooperating defects form the chain: (1) unescaped xmlns value concatenated into the synthesized context tag; (2) synchronous customized-built-in Upgrade with no post-constructor parent check; (3) debug-only 'no existing parent' invariant in InsertChildBefore; (4) BindToTree skipping the parent AddRef when the node already had a parent.
Exploit Chain
- Attacker page (XHTML) defines a customized built-in element 'evil-is' (extends <p>) whose constructor appends
thisto a detached holder div. - Attacker sets an xmlns attribute on a div to 'x"/><p xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" is="evil-is"/><notacustomelement q="y' and calls Range.createContextualFragment on a range inside that div.
- nsContentUtils::CreateContextualFragment concatenates the raw xmlns value into the synthesized context tag; nsParser::ParseFragment wraps it in angle brackets, so expat parses an injected self-closed <p is="evil-is"/> as a child of the synthesized context element CTX.
- nsXMLContentSink::CreateElement passes FROM_PARSER_NETWORK, so nsContentUtils::NewXULOrHTMLElement runs CustomElementRegistry::Upgrade synchronously; the author constructor executes mid-parse and parents the new element E into the detached holder. The Upgrade path never checks that E is still unparented.
- Back in nsXMLContentSink::HandleStartElement, parent->AppendChildTo(E) runs; InsertChildBefore's no-existing-parent invariant is debug-only, and Element::BindToTree sees hadParent==true and sets E.mParent = CTX without NS_ADDREF — E now holds an unowned raw pointer to CTX.
- JS removes CTX's two legitimate children (the synthesized 'notacustomelement' siblings), releasing CTX's only owning references; CTX's refcount reaches zero and the cycle collector's FreeSnowWhite frees the 136-byte HTMLUnknownElement.
- JS calls HOLDER.contains(E): nsINode::IsInclusiveDescendantOf walks E's ancestor chain through raw GetParentNode() pointers and reads the freed CTX (ASAN: heap-use-after-free READ of size 8).
- For exploitation, the attacker instead reclaims the freed 136-byte DOM-arena slot with controlled data before the ancestor walk (or before parentNode wrapping / E.remove(), which perform writes and virtual-call-adjacent accesses through the dangling pointer), converting the UAF into control over a fake nsINode and ultimately arbitrary code execution in the content process.
Steps to Reproduce
- Build Firefox with the ASAN fuzzing mozconfig (mozconfig.linux.asan.fuzzing).
- Serve testcase.xhtml (the provided XHTML testcase) over HTTP and load it in the ASAN build; prefs browser.dom.window.dump.enabled=true and devtools.console.stdout.content=true are used only for log output and are not required for the crash.
- The page defines the 'evil-is' customized built-in, injects markup via the xmlns attribute value, calls Range.createContextualFragment, removes the two sibling context elements, then repeatedly calls HOLDER.contains(E) while churning allocations to trigger cycle-collector FreeSnowWhite.
- Within ~10-20 seconds ASAN reports heap-use-after-free READ of size 8 in nsINode::GetParentNode (inlined into nsINode::Contains), with the freed object allocated at NS_NewHTMLUnknownElement under nsXMLFragmentContentSink::CreateElement and freed by nsCycleCollector::FreeSnowWhite.
Security Impact
- Severity: High
- Attacker capability: A web page, with no user interaction and default settings, obtains a dangling pointer from a live DOM element to a freed 136-byte DOM-arena allocation. The freed slot can be reclaimed with attacker-controlled data, after which many raw-pointer consumers (ancestor walks, parentNode wrapping, node removal writes) operate on a fake nsINode, providing a strong primitive for arbitrary code execution in the content process.
- Preconditions: None beyond loading an attacker-controlled XHTML page in a default-configuration Firefox. No prefs, patches, or unusual user interaction required; custom elements and Range.createContextualFragment are standard web APIs.
ASAN Report
==11521==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7587e2107480 at pc 0x74b7ba03cbce bp 0x7ffdb69fce50 sp 0x7ffdb69fce48
READ of size 8 at 0x7587e2107480 thread T0 (WebCOOP+COEP Co)
#0 0x74b7ba03cbcd in nsINode::GetParentNode() const /firefox/dom/base/nsINode.h:1411:57
#1 0x74b7ba03cbcd in mozilla::dom::InclusiveAncestors::operator++() /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/AncestorIterator.h:69:1
#2 0x74b7ba03cbcd in nsINode::IsInclusiveDescendantOf(nsINode const*) const /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/nsINode.cpp:175:22
#3 0x74b7ba03cbcd in nsINode::Contains(nsINode const*) const /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/nsINode.cpp:3669:18
#4 0x74b7baa3c705 in mozilla::dom::Node_Binding::contains(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JSObject*>, void*, JSJitMethodCallArgs const&) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/bindings/./NodeBinding.cpp:1396:36
#5 0x74b7bc097b86 in bool mozilla::dom::binding_detail::GenericMethod<mozilla::dom::binding_detail::NormalThisPolicy, mozilla::dom::binding_detail::ThrowExceptions>(JSContext*, unsigned int, JS::Value*) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/bindings/./../../../dom/bindings/BindingUtils.cpp:3215:13
#6 0x3fecbb444834 (<unknown module>)
0x7587e2107480 is located 48 bytes inside of 136-byte region [0x7587e2107450,0x7587e21074d8)
freed by thread T0 (WebCOOP+COEP Co) here:
#0 0x59e6764a6746 in __interceptor_free _asan_rtl_:3
#1 0x74b7b9cf96c6 in nsNodeInfoManager::Free(void*) /firefox/dom/base/nsNodeInfoManager.h:116:27
#2 0x74b7b9cf96c6 in nsIContent::Destroy() /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/FragmentOrElement.cpp:133:1
#3 0x74b7b62a9b53 in SnowWhiteKiller::~SnowWhiteKiller() /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/xpcom/base/./../../../xpcom/base/nsCycleCollector.cpp:2664:7
#4 0x74b7b62901b1 in nsCycleCollector::FreeSnowWhite(bool) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/xpcom/base/./../../../xpcom/base/nsCycleCollector.cpp:2855:3
#5 0x74b7b6a0805f in XPCJSContext::AfterProcessTask(unsigned int) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/js/xpconnect/src/./../../../../js/xpconnect/src/XPCJSContext.cpp:1532:28
#6 0x74b7b64902c1 in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/xpcom/threads/./../../../xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1235:24
[...]
previously allocated by thread T0 (WebCOOP+COEP Co) here:
#0 0x59e6764a69e4 in __interceptor_malloc _asan_rtl_:3
#1 0x74b7b9ae12c5 in mozilla::dom::DOMArena::Allocate(unsigned long) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dist/include/mozilla/dom/DOMArena.h:44:17
#2 0x74b7b9ae12c5 in nsNodeInfoManager::Allocate(unsigned long) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/nsNodeInfoManager.cpp:283:20
#3 0x74b7bd6e7a27 in NS_NewHTMLUnknownElement(already_AddRefed<mozilla::dom::NodeInfo>, mozilla::dom::FromParser) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/html/./../../../dom/html/HTMLUnknownElement.cpp:11:1
#4 0x74b7bd5ee27c in CreateHTMLElement(unsigned int, already_AddRefed<mozilla::dom::NodeInfo>, mozilla::dom::FromParser) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/html/./../../../dom/html/HTMLElementFactory.cpp:72:41
#5 0x74b7b97c1be2 in nsContentUtils::NewXULOrHTMLElement(...) /firefox/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp:12211:18
#6 0x74b7bd5ee148 in NS_NewHTMLElement(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/html/./../../../dom/html/HTMLElementFactory.cpp:56:10
#7 0x74b7ba0d6fbe in NS_NewElement(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/nsNameSpaceManager.cpp:208:12
#9 0x74b7c151adf8 in nsXMLContentSink::CreateElement(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/xml/./../../../dom/xml/nsXMLContentSink.cpp:529:10
#10 0x74b7c15268e3 in nsXMLFragmentContentSink::CreateElement(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/xml/./../../../dom/xml/nsXMLFragmentContentSink.cpp:167:35
#11 0x74b7c151f6d0 in nsXMLContentSink::HandleStartElement(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/xml/./../../../dom/xml/nsXMLContentSink.cpp:1011:12
#14 0x74b7b6e754a3 in nsExpatDriver::HandleStartElement(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/parser/htmlparser/./../../../parser/htmlparser/nsExpatDriver.cpp:479:32
[rlbox-sandboxed expat frames: w2c_rlbox_doContent/doProlog/prologProcessor/callProcessor/XML_Parse_0]
#22 0x74b7b6e7ec1a in nsExpatDriver::ParseChunk(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/parser/htmlparser/./../../../parser/htmlparser/nsExpatDriver.cpp:1240:14
#25 0x74b7b6e8bc52 in nsParser::ResumeParse(bool, bool, bool) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/parser/htmlparser/./../../../parser/htmlparser/nsParser.cpp:706:48
#26 0x74b7b6e8c70f in nsParser::Parse(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/parser/htmlparser/./../../../parser/htmlparser/nsParser.cpp:560:10
#27 0x74b7b6e8cb2e in nsParser::ParseFragment(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/parser/htmlparser/./../../../parser/htmlparser/nsParser.cpp:590:12
#28 0x74b7b978099e in nsContentUtils::ParseFragmentXML(...) /firefox/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp:7265:37
#29 0x74b7b977efe7 in nsContentUtils::CreateContextualFragment(...) /firefox/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp:6886:9
#30 0x74b7b9b07352 in nsRange::CreateContextualFragment(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/nsRange.cpp:2777:10
#31 0x74b7baf14d3b in mozilla::dom::Range_Binding::createContextualFragment(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/bindings/./RangeBinding.cpp:1308:83
[... JS engine frames ...]
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free (/firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dist/bin/libxul.so+0x18947bcd) (BuildId: 58e09999d32b069c4f064daeff51cf86)
==11521==ABORTING
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Updated•4 months ago
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Comment 12•4 months ago
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Hi Keith, can you take a first look at this? Thanks.
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Updated•4 months ago
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Please add uplift requests for Beta and ESR115, ESR140, and ESR153
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Comment 18•4 months ago
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Original Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D312076
Updated•4 months ago
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Comment 19•4 months ago
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firefox-beta Uplift Approval Request
- User impact if declined/Reason for urgency: sec-high issue
- Code covered by automated testing?: yes
- Fix verified in Nightly?: yes
- Needs manual QE testing?: no
- Steps to reproduce for manual QE testing:
- Risk associated with taking this patch: low
- Explanation of risk level: Corrects an oversight, aligning to the spec, while also preventing sec-high issue.
- String changes made/needed?: N/A
- Is Android affected?: yes
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Comment 20•4 months ago
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Original Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D312076
Updated•4 months ago
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Comment 21•4 months ago
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firefox-release Uplift Approval Request
- User impact if declined/Reason for urgency: sec-high issue
- Code covered by automated testing?: yes
- Fix verified in Nightly?: yes
- Needs manual QE testing?: no
- Steps to reproduce for manual QE testing:
- Risk associated with taking this patch: low
- Explanation of risk level: Corrects an oversight, aligning to the spec, while also preventing sec-high issue.
- String changes made/needed?: N/A
- Is Android affected?: yes
Comment 22•4 months ago
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firefox-esr115 Uplift Approval Request
- User impact if declined/Reason for urgency: sec-high issue
- Code covered by automated testing?: yes
- Fix verified in Nightly?: yes
- Needs manual QE testing?: no
- Steps to reproduce for manual QE testing:
- Risk associated with taking this patch: low
- Explanation of risk level: Corrects an oversight, aligning to the spec, while also preventing sec-high issue.
- String changes made/needed?: N/A
- Is Android affected?: yes
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Comment 23•4 months ago
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Original Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D312076
Comment 24•4 months ago
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firefox-esr140 Uplift Approval Request
- User impact if declined/Reason for urgency: sec-high issue
- Code covered by automated testing?: yes
- Fix verified in Nightly?: yes
- Needs manual QE testing?: no
- Steps to reproduce for manual QE testing:
- Risk associated with taking this patch: low
- Explanation of risk level: Corrects an oversight, aligning to the spec, while also preventing sec-high issue.
- String changes made/needed?: N/A
- Is Android affected?: yes
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Comment 25•4 months ago
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Original Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D312076
Comment 26•4 months ago
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firefox-esr153 Uplift Approval Request
- User impact if declined/Reason for urgency: sec-high issue
- Code covered by automated testing?: yes
- Fix verified in Nightly?: yes
- Needs manual QE testing?: no
- Steps to reproduce for manual QE testing:
- Risk associated with taking this patch: low
- Explanation of risk level: Corrects an oversight, aligning to the spec, while also preventing sec-high issue.
- String changes made/needed?: N/A
- Is Android affected?: yes
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Comment 27•4 months ago
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Original Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D312076
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Comment 33•3 months ago
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Comment on attachment 9613875 [details]
(secure)
-> 154
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Comment 35•3 months ago
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Updated•23 days ago
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Description
•