Use-after-free (dangling last-child pointer) in [@ nsINode::AppendChildToChildList] via synchronous custom element upgrade during XML parsing
Categories
(Core :: DOM: Core & HTML, defect)
Tracking
()
People
(Reporter: bugmon, Assigned: keithamus)
Details
(5 keywords)
Attachments
(5 files)
When the XML content sink parses a customized built-in element (e.g. <button is="my-button"> in an XHTML document), nsContentUtils::NewXULOrHTMLElement synchronously runs CustomElementRegistry::Upgrade, executing the author's constructor before the sink attaches the new element to its parser parent. The constructor can insert the half-created element elsewhere in the DOM (giving it a parent and a next sibling). The sink then unconditionally calls parent->AppendChildTo(content, ...) (nsXMLContentSink.cpp:1033); nsINode::InsertChildBefore guards against an already-parented child only with a debug-only MOZ_ASSERT, so in release builds the element is spliced into a second parent's child list while still linked into the first parent's list.
This corrupts the doubly-linked sibling list invariants. In the testcase, the button (now first child of #target) still holds mNextSibling pointing at a <span> that remains linked as the last child of #stash. When the parser appends the next sibling (<p>) to #target, button->mNextSibling = p releases the span's only strong reference and it is destroyed — but #stash's cached last-child pointer (mFirstChild->mPreviousOrLastSibling, a raw pointer) still points at the freed span. A later stash.appendChild() calls nsINode::GetLastChild(), dereferences the dangling pointer in AppendChildToChildList (nsINode.cpp:2273), reads the stale nsCOMPtr value from freed memory (invoking Release() on an attacker-groomable pointer — a controlled virtual-call primitive) and writes the new child pointer into the freed slot.
This is reachable from ordinary untrusted web content in a default configuration (no prefs, no user interaction beyond loading a page): it only requires an XHTML document, a customized built-in custom element definition, and heap grooming. It provides both a use-after-free write of a controlled pointer and a Release() virtual call through attacker-controlled freed memory, making it a strong candidate for content-process remote code execution.
Build Info
- Branch: main
- Revision: 3f0a76a52d496d01003b91cb2350557c1a9870a4
- Timestamp: 2026-07-10T16:32:00+00:00
Affected Code
File: dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp, line 12128-12143
if (definition->IsCustomBuiltIn()) {
// 4.2. "Set result to the result of creating an element internal..."
if (nodeInfo->NamespaceEquals(kNameSpaceID_XHTML)) {
*aResult =
CreateHTMLElement(*tag, nodeInfo.forget(), aFromParser).take();
} else {
NS_IF_ADDREF(*aResult = nsXULElement::Construct(nodeInfo.forget()));
}
(*aResult)->SetCustomElementData(MakeUnique<CustomElementData>(typeAtom));
if (synchronousCustomElements) {
// 4.3. "If synchronousCustomElements is true, then run this step while
// catching any exceptions: Upgrade result using definition."
CustomElementRegistry::Upgrade(*aResult, definition, rv); // <-- runs author constructor; script may parent the element and give it siblings
if (rv.MaybeSetPendingException(cx)) {
aes.ReportException();
}
}
File: dom/xml/nsXMLContentSink.cpp, line 1028-1034
if (NS_OK == result) {
// Store the element
if (!SetDocElement(nameSpaceID, localName, content) && appendContent) {
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(parent, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
parent->AppendChildTo(content, false, IgnoreErrors()); // <-- no check that the upgrade constructor already parented `content`
}
}
File: dom/base/nsINode.cpp, line 2140-2170
void nsINode::InsertChildBefore(
nsIContent* aKid, nsIContent* aBeforeThis, bool aNotify, ErrorResult& aRv,
nsINode* aOldParent, MutationEffectOnScript aMutationEffectOnScript) {
...
MOZ_ASSERT(!aKid->GetParentNode(), "Inserting node that already has parent"); // <-- debug-only; no release-mode guard
...
if (!aBeforeThis) {
AppendChildToChildList(aKid);
}
File: dom/base/nsINode.cpp, line 2265-2282
void nsINode::AppendChildToChildList(nsIContent* aKid) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aKid);
MOZ_ASSERT(!aKid->mNextSibling); // <-- violated silently in release: button keeps mNextSibling -> span
RemoveFromCache(this);
if (mFirstChild) {
nsIContent* lastChild = GetLastChild(); // <-- returns dangling raw pointer to the freed span
lastChild->mNextSibling = aKid; // <-- CRASH: UAF read of stale nsCOMPtr (Release on controlled ptr) + UAF pointer write
aKid->mPreviousOrLastSibling = lastChild;
} else {
mFirstChild = aKid;
}
// Maintain link to the last child
mFirstChild->mPreviousOrLastSibling = aKid;
++mChildCount;
}
File: dom/base/nsINode.cpp, line 1172-1174
nsIContent* nsINode::GetLastChild() const {
return mFirstChild ? mFirstChild->mPreviousOrLastSibling : nullptr; // <-- raw (weak) pointer; left dangling after the span is destroyed
}
The upgrade runs author script before the parser attaches the element; the sink's low-level append has no release-mode protection against a child that already has a parent or a next sibling; the cached last-child pointer is a raw (weak) pointer that goes stale when the sibling list is corrupted.
Exploit Chain
- Attacker serves an XHTML page defining a customized built-in element ('my-button' extending 'button') whose constructor re-enters DOM mutation: it appends
thisinto a stash <div> and then uses insertAdjacentHTML to insert an empty <span> after it. - The XML parser encounters <button is="my-button"> inside #target. nsXMLContentSink::CreateElement -> NS_NewElement -> nsContentUtils::NewXULOrHTMLElement synchronously calls CustomElementRegistry::Upgrade (nsContentUtils.cpp:12140), running the author constructor before the sink attaches the element.
- After the constructor, the button is a child of #stash with mNextSibling -> span (the span's only strong reference), and #stash's cached last-child raw pointer (mFirstChild(<a>)->mPreviousOrLastSibling) points at the span.
- The sink then calls parent(#target)->AppendChildTo(button) (nsXMLContentSink.cpp:1033). InsertChildBefore's already-has-parent check is debug-only, so AppendChildToChildList splices the button into #target's child list while it is still linked into #stash's list, silently violating MOZ_ASSERT(!aKid->mNextSibling).
- The parser appends the next sibling <p> to #target: GetLastChild() returns the button and
button->mNextSibling = preleases the span's only strong reference, destroying it. #stash's raw last-child pointer now dangles. - The page applies allocation pressure (ArrayBuffer churn over several timer ticks) so the freed span's memory is recycled/returned to the allocator, allowing the attacker to place controlled data at the stale nsCOMPtr slot.
- The page calls stash.appendChild(newTextNode): AppendChildToChildList dereferences the dangling last-child pointer, reads the stale mNextSibling nsCOMPtr from freed memory and calls Release() on it (a virtual call through an attacker-groomable pointer), then writes the new child pointer into the freed slot — combined UAF read/virtual-call and UAF pointer-write primitives suitable for content-process code execution.
Steps to Reproduce
- Build Firefox from a clean tree with the ASAN fuzzing mozconfig (mozconfig.linux.asan.fuzzing).
- Serve the provided testcase.xhtml over HTTP (must be parsed as XML/XHTML so the nsXMLContentSink path is used); no custom prefs, patches, or servers are required.
- Load the page and wait ~8 seconds while the script runs 10 rounds of ArrayBuffer allocation pressure via setTimeout.
- On the final round, the script calls stash.appendChild(document.createTextNode('z')), which dereferences the dangling last-child pointer; ASAN reports a heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 8 in nsCOMPtr<nsIContent>::assign_assuming_AddRef inside nsINode::AppendChildToChildList in the content process.
Security Impact
- Severity: High
- Attacker capability: An attacker controlling ordinary web content gets a use-after-free on a DOM node: AppendChildToChildList reads a stale nsCOMPtr from attacker-reclaimable freed memory and calls Release() on it (controlled virtual call), then writes a live node pointer into the freed allocation. With standard heap grooming this is a strong primitive for arbitrary code execution in the content process.
- Preconditions: None beyond loading an attacker-controlled page in a default configuration: the document must be parsed as XHTML/XML and define a customized built-in custom element (both available to web content by default; no prefs, no user interaction, no compromised process required). Reliability depends on heap grooming, but the testcase triggers it deterministically without OOM.
ASAN Report
==7691==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x77227a20be88 at pc 0x7652520e6aeb bp 0x7ffd6e5f8c30 sp 0x7ffd6e5f8c28
READ of size 8 at 0x77227a20be88 thread T0 (WebCOOP+COEP Co)
#0 0x7652520e6aea in nsCOMPtr<nsIContent>::assign_assuming_AddRef(nsIContent*) /firefox/xpcom/base/nsCOMPtr.h:313:17
#1 0x7652520e6aea in nsCOMPtr<nsIContent>::assign_with_AddRef(nsIContent*) /firefox/xpcom/base/nsCOMPtr.h:808:3
#2 0x7652520e6aea in nsCOMPtr<nsIContent>::operator=(nsIContent*) /firefox/xpcom/base/nsCOMPtr.h:586:5
#3 0x7652520e6aea in nsINode::AppendChildToChildList(nsIContent*) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/nsINode.cpp:2273:29
#4 0x7652520e61ba in nsINode::InsertChildBefore(nsIContent*, nsIContent*, bool, mozilla::ErrorResult&, nsINode*, MutationEffectOnScript) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/nsINode.cpp:2167:5
#5 0x7652520f0c9c in nsINode::ReplaceOrInsertBefore(bool, nsINode*, nsINode*, MutationEffectOnScript, mozilla::ErrorResult&) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/nsINode.cpp:3560:5
#6 0x765252a8392b in nsINode::InsertBeforeInternal(nsINode&, nsINode*, MutationEffectOnScript, mozilla::ErrorResult&) /firefox/dom/base/nsINode.h:2911:12
#7 0x765252a8392b in nsINode::AppendChildInternal(nsINode&, MutationEffectOnScript, mozilla::ErrorResult&) /firefox/dom/base/nsINode.h:2925:12
#8 0x765252a8392b in nsINode::AppendChild(nsINode&, mozilla::ErrorResult&) /firefox/dom/base/nsINode.h:2919:12
#9 0x765252a8392b in mozilla::dom::Node_Binding::appendChild(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JSObject*>, void*, JSJitMethodCallArgs const&) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/bindings/./NodeBinding.cpp:951:60
#10 0x7652540e3496 in bool mozilla::dom::binding_detail::GenericMethod<...>(JSContext*, unsigned int, JS::Value*) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/bindings/./../../../dom/bindings/BindingUtils.cpp:3215:13
[... JS interpreter frames ...]
#24 0x765251f9b95c in mozilla::dom::CallbackTimeoutHandler::Call(char const*) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/TimeoutHandler.cpp:167:29
#25 0x76525193e08d in nsGlobalWindowInner::RunTimeoutHandler(mozilla::dom::Timeout*) /firefox/dom/base/nsGlobalWindowInner.cpp:6604:38
#26 0x765251f95eec in mozilla::dom::TimeoutManager::RunTimeout(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/TimeoutManager.cpp:955:39
[... event loop frames ...]
0x77227a20be88 is located 1176 bytes after 144-byte region [0x77227a20b960,0x77227a20b9f0)
allocated by thread T0 (WebCOOP+COEP Co) here:
#0 0x57fec72ce9e4 in __interceptor_malloc _asan_rtl_:3
#1 0x57fec73240b5 in moz_xmalloc /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/memory/mozalloc/./../../../memory/mozalloc/mozalloc.cpp:48:15
#2 0x7652517cbed3 in operator new(unsigned long) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dist/include/mozilla/cxxalloc.h:33:10
#3 0x7652517cbed3 in nsContentUtils::ParseFragmentXML(...) /firefox/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp:7229:31
#4 0x7652517ca8f7 in nsContentUtils::CreateContextualFragment(...) /firefox/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp:6886:9
#5 0x765251d17c61 in mozilla::dom::Element::InsertAdjacentHTML(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/Element.cpp:5608:39
[... JS frames ...]
#19 0x765253bcbf78 in mozilla::dom::CustomElementConstructor::Construct(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/bindings/./CustomElementRegistryBinding.cpp:99:8
#20 0x765251a9b632 in mozilla::dom::(anonymous namespace)::DoUpgrade(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/CustomElementRegistry.cpp:1511:17
#21 0x765251a9b632 in mozilla::dom::CustomElementRegistry::Upgrade(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/CustomElementRegistry.cpp:1599:3
#22 0x76525180d74e in nsContentUtils::NewXULOrHTMLElement(...) /firefox/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp:12140:9
#23 0x76525566df58 in NS_NewHTMLElement(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/html/./../../../dom/html/HTMLElementFactory.cpp:56:10
#24 0x7652521228ce in NS_NewElement(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/base/./../../../dom/base/nsNameSpaceManager.cpp:208:12
#26 0x7652595a02d7 in nsXMLContentSink::CreateElement(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/xml/./../../../dom/xml/nsXMLContentSink.cpp:526:10
#27 0x7652595a4c10 in nsXMLContentSink::HandleStartElement(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dom/xml/./../../../dom/xml/nsXMLContentSink.cpp:1011:12
#30 0x76524eec0c63 in nsExpatDriver::HandleStartElement(...) /firefox/obj-firefox-asan/parser/htmlparser/./../../../parser/htmlparser/nsExpatDriver.cpp:479:32
[... expat/rlbox frames ...]
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dist/bin/libxul.so+0x189a6aea) (BuildId: 6179a7572e62e98ec2cc8f392240bcf6)
| Reporter | ||
Comment 1•4 months ago
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| Reporter | ||
Comment 2•4 months ago
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| Reporter | ||
Comment 3•4 months ago
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| Reporter | ||
Comment 4•4 months ago
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| Reporter | ||
Comment 5•4 months ago
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Updated•4 months ago
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Comment 7•4 months ago
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Hi Keith, can you take a first look at this? Thanks.
| Assignee | ||
Updated•4 months ago
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Comment 8•4 months ago
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We believe this is a duplicate of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2054635 and we plan to test against nightly to be sure.
| Assignee | ||
Comment 9•4 months ago
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Yes. Looks like this is resolved in current nightly. Marking as fixed.
Updated•15 days ago
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Description
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