Closed Bug 311024 Opened 19 years ago Closed 19 years ago

eval(code, window) allows XSS attacks

Categories

(Core :: Security, defect)

defect
Not set
critical

Tracking

()

VERIFIED FIXED
mozilla1.8beta5

People

(Reporter: sync2d, Assigned: mrbkap)

References

Details

(Keywords: fixed1.8, verified1.7.13, Whiteboard: [sg:high] xss splitwindows?)

Attachments

(2 files, 1 obsolete file)

Several months ago, bug 296639 (split-window) fixed bug 296514 and bug 298315. The problem is solved by linking closures' __parent__ to inner window object instead of outer window object. SO they get right principal when executing. However, this restriction can be circumvented by eval(code, window) because "window" property refers to the outer window object.
Attached file XSS testcase
testcase Works on: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.9a1) Gecko/20051003 Firefox/1.6a1
Status: UNCONFIRMED → NEW
Ever confirmed: true
Flags: blocking1.8b5+
Target Milestone: --- → mozilla1.8beta5
We probably need an innerObject hook in JSExtendedClass. jst, mrbkap: any other ideas? /be
(In reply to comment #2) > We probably need an innerObject hook in JSExtendedClass. jst, mrbkap: any other > ideas? I have one, and this has been proposed before, bz will recall it: never let anyone get object principals from an outer window object. Make them eat not-a-principal or whatever it's called. There was some reason, a while back in the split window death march, for forwarding to the inner window when getting object principals. I call that a security hole, and this bug is the proof. /be
Testcase works on 1.0.7 as well. Is that the same bug, or simply the original problem split-windows was trying to fix?
Flags: blocking1.7.13+
Flags: blocking-aviary1.0.8+
Whiteboard: [sg:high xss]
(In reply to comment #4) > Testcase works on 1.0.7 as well. Is that the same bug, or simply the original > problem split-windows was trying to fix? They're the same problem. Comment 0 contains the key. In past releases, there was only one window object, not one outer and one or more inners for each entry in session history. So if an attacker could run a lexical closure in the scope of the window after navigating away from the attacker's document, it would run with the principals of the new document to which the window was navigated currently. With split window objects, so long as the outer window supports geting the object princpals from the current inner window, if an attacker can lexically capture the outer window in a scope chain, the same exploit works. The outer window must never return the principals for the current window, or for any other window in session history. It should return not-a-principal, or until we implement that special singleton, an about:blank codebase principal. /be
Hoping jst can try again to neuter getting object principals from outer window objects, and make it work for all cases this time. /be
Assignee: dveditz → jst
> never let anyone get object principals from an outer window object. We can't really do that, as far as I can see. More precisely, say I have a window object in my code (outer one, since that's the only way to really get an explicit window object). Say someone's trying to access a property on it. We need to do a security check. What principals do you suggest we use for it? At the moment we use those of the inner window, which is what makes the most sense, really... And this is a use case we really don't want to break, since this is the |var win = window.open()| use case.
(In reply to comment #7) > At the moment we use those of the inner window, > which is what makes the most sense, really... This "at the moment" could be read other than how you meant it, as "at the moment, or moments, when the current inner window is the one to which the script should have access." The problem ie lexical environment capture of the outer window. In talking this through with jst (who patiently re-reviewed the use-cases for me) and mrbkap, it became clear that the only fix is to stop environment capture from entraining the outer window. So I sketched a plan to add innerObject to JSExtendedClass, and mrbkap is running with it. He is indefatigable! /be
Assignee: jst → mrbkap
moving out to RC1.
Flags: blocking1.8rc1?
Flags: blocking1.8b5-
Flags: blocking1.8b5+
'with (window) eval(code)' should have the same effect, btw. /be
Status: NEW → ASSIGNED
Flags: blocking1.8b5- → blocking1.8b5+
Attached patch patch v1 (obsolete) — Splinter Review
Brendan, is this something like what you had in mind? I'm not sure if the jsscript.c changes are strictly necessary (or if we need to make script_{compile,exec} look more like obj_eval wrt the principals changes; if so, we might consider breaking the common stuff out into common functions).
Attachment #198625 - Flags: review?(brendan)
Comment on attachment 198625 [details] [diff] [review] patch v1 Drive-by review comments... +/* NB: The outerObject and innerObjects hooks are assumed to be infallible. */ ... but then you've got: +JS_STATIC_DLL_CALLBACK(JSObject *) +XPC_WN_InnerObject(JSContext *cx, JSObject *obj) +{ + XPCWrappedNative *wrapper = + XPCWrappedNative::GetWrappedNativeOfJSObject(cx, obj); + if(!wrapper) + { + Throw(NS_ERROR_XPC_BAD_OP_ON_WN_PROTO, cx); + + return nsnull; + } etc etc. So this, and the existing outerObject impl here should never return null.
Comment on attachment 198625 [details] [diff] [review] patch v1 >+/* NB: The outerObject and innerObjects hooks are assumed to be infallible. */ > struct JSExtendedClass { > JSClass base; > JSEqualityOp equality; > JSObjectOp outerObject; >+ JSObjectOp innerObject; > jsword reserved0; Don't forget to remove one 0, from JSCLASS_NO_RESERVED_MEMBERS too. >+ /* Ensure we compile this eval with the right object in the scope chain. */ >+ clasp = OBJ_GET_CLASS(cx, scopeobj); >+ if (clasp->flags & JSCLASS_IS_EXTENDED) { >+ JSExtendedClass *xclasp; >+ >+ xclasp = (JSExtendedClass*)clasp; >+ if (xclasp->innerObject) { >+ scopeobj = xclasp->innerObject(cx, scopeobj); >+ JS_ASSERT(scopeobj); >+ } >+ } If it doesn't win in optimized code space (never mind cycles, they don't matter with eval) to subroutine this for use here and from jsscript.c, at least macroize in jsobj.h? >+JS_STATIC_DLL_CALLBACK(JSObject *) >+XPC_WN_InnerObject(JSContext *cx, JSObject *obj) >+{ >+ XPCWrappedNative *wrapper = >+ XPCWrappedNative::GetWrappedNativeOfJSObject(cx, obj); >+ if(!wrapper) >+ { >+ Throw(NS_ERROR_XPC_BAD_OP_ON_WN_PROTO, cx); >+ >+ return nsnull; >+ } >+ >+ if(!wrapper->IsValid()) >+ { >+ Throw(NS_ERROR_XPC_HAS_BEEN_SHUTDOWN, cx); >+ >+ return nsnull; >+ } Shouldn't these all return obj and not Throw (at most NS_WARNING)? As written, besides botching the JS_ASSERTs you have in the open-coded scopeobj inner-izing paragraphs, won't they lead to null deref crashes immediately after? >+ >+ XPCNativeScriptableInfo* si = wrapper->GetScriptableInfo(); >+ if(si && si->GetFlags().WantInnerObject()) >+ { >+ JSObject *newThis; >+ nsresult rv = >+ si->GetCallback()->InnerObject(wrapper, cx, obj, &newThis); >+ >+ if(NS_FAILED(rv)) >+ { >+ Throw(rv, cx); >+ >+ return nsnull; Same here. This suggests deCOMTaminating InnerObject. Is that thinkable? We really don't need an nsresult r.v. with a JSObject ** out param, just a JSObject * r.v. >@@ -842,21 +881,22 @@ JSExtendedClass XPC_WN_NoHelper_JSClass > nsnull, // getObjectOps; > nsnull, // checkAccess; > nsnull, // call; > nsnull, // construct; > nsnull, // xdrObject; > nsnull, // hasInstance; > XPC_WN_Shared_Mark, // mark; > nsnull // spare; > }, > XPC_WN_Equality, >- XPC_WN_OuterObject >+ XPC_WN_OuterObject, >+ XPC_WN_InnerObject So you should use JSCLASS_NO_RESERVED_MEMBERS here. >@@ -6107,20 +6117,50 @@ nsWindowSH::OuterObject(nsIXPConnectWrap > // never be called when we have no outer. But just in case, return > // null to prevent leaking an inner window to code in a different > // window. > > *_retval = nsnull; Ok, if outerObject can return null without Throwing, then it's infallible but nullable. So innerObject should be the same. No Throw, null might be ok, but caller has to defend. >+NS_IMETHODIMP >+nsWindowSH::InnerObject(nsIXPConnectWrappedNative *wrapper, JSContext * cx, >+ JSObject * obj, JSObject * *_retval) >+{ >+ nsGlobalWindow *win = nsGlobalWindow::FromWrapper(wrapper); >+ >+ if (win->IsInnerWindow()) { >+ // Return the inner window. >+ >+ *_retval = win->GetGlobalJSObject(); >+ } else { >+ // Try to find the current inner window. If there isn't one, then we're >+ // setting up the window (i.e., this is before we even have a document) so >+ // we can just return the outer window. >+ >+ nsGlobalWindow *inner = win->GetCurrentInnerWindowInternal(); >+ *_retval = inner >+ ? inner->GetGlobalJSObject() >+ : nsnull; Does not agree with comment or with caller expectations, although nullability implies defensive callers (but that's more code -- ideally, we'd remove nullability for both innerObject and outerObject). /be
Attachment #198625 - Flags: review?(brendan) → review-
Flags: blocking1.8rc1?
Flags: blocking1.8rc1+
Flags: blocking1.8b5+
(In reply to comment #13) > Shouldn't these all return obj and not Throw (at most NS_WARNING)? As written, > besides botching the JS_ASSERTs you have in the open-coded scopeobj inner-izing > paragraphs, won't they lead to null deref crashes immediately after? I fixed this in response to comment 12, but this sort of scares me. Perhaps we should not assume that these operations are infallible. If someone finds a bug in XPConnect to fail at some point here, it would be exploitable here to grab references to bad objects (or objects with bad scope chains). > Same here. This suggests deCOMTaminating InnerObject. Is that thinkable? We > really don't need an nsresult r.v. with a JSObject ** out param, just a > JSObject * r.v. nsIXPCScriptable is an idl interface. This sort of thing is just asking for its own bug. > Ok, if outerObject can return null without Throwing, then it's infallible but > nullable. So innerObject should be the same. No Throw, null might be ok, but > caller has to defend. I turned this into an NS_ERROR here. This feels like another reason to not force these hooks to be infallible. > >+ nsGlobalWindow *inner = win->GetCurrentInnerWindowInternal(); > >+ *_retval = inner > >+ ? inner->GetGlobalJSObject() > >+ : nsnull; > > Does not agree with comment or with caller expectations, although nullability > implies defensive callers (but that's more code -- ideally, we'd remove > nullability for both innerObject and outerObject). > This one is OK. I felt that setting |obj| twice, so see the if (!*_retval) clause after this if statement. I'll attach a new patch tomorrow.
Attached patch patch v2Splinter Review
It turns out that we didn't treat outerObject as being infallible. innerObject follows in outerObject's footsteps. This patch makes us throw in more cases.
Attachment #198625 - Attachment is obsolete: true
Attachment #198850 - Flags: review?(brendan)
Comment on attachment 198850 [details] [diff] [review] patch v2 Nits only: 1. Invert if/else sense in nsWindowSH::OuterObject to avoid bogo-control-flow: if (foo) { bar } else { baz; return UNEXPECTED; } return OK; 2. Use trailing _, not leading, for local names in OBJ_TO_INNER_OBJECT, to avoid invading the C impl namespace. /be
Attachment #198850 - Flags: review?(brendan) → review+
Comment on attachment 198850 [details] [diff] [review] patch v2 AIUI the C impl namespace reserves _<CAPITAL> and anything containing __, but I'll yield.
Attachment #198850 - Flags: superreview?(jst)
Comment on attachment 198850 [details] [diff] [review] patch v2 +nsWindowSH::InnerObject(nsIXPConnectWrappedNative *wrapper, JSContext * cx, + JSObject * obj, JSObject * *_retval) +{ + nsGlobalWindow *win = nsGlobalWindow::FromWrapper(wrapper); + + if (win->IsInnerWindow()) { + // Return the inner window. + + *_retval = win->GetGlobalJSObject(); That could just be *_retval = obj here. sr=jst
Attachment #198850 - Flags: superreview?(jst) → superreview+
Fix checked into trunk.
Status: ASSIGNED → RESOLVED
Closed: 19 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
Comment on attachment 198850 [details] [diff] [review] patch v2 This fixes a security hole. The fix only affects consumers of eval who explicitly pass in a window as a scope object.
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval1.8rc1?
Depends on: splitwindows
Whiteboard: [sg:high xss] → [sg:high] xss (splitwindows?)
Depends on: 311619
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval1.8rc1? → approval1.8rc1+
Blocks: 311962
Blocks: sbb?
No longer blocks: 311962
Fix checked into MOZILLA_1_8_BRANCH.
Keywords: fixed1.8
Flags: testcase+
Whiteboard: [sg:high] xss (splitwindows?) → [sg:high] xss
Comment on attachment 198850 [details] [diff] [review] patch v2 aviary101/moz17 landing approval: a=dveditz for drivers. Please add the fixed1.7.13 and fixed-aviary1.0.8 keywords when landed.
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval1.7.13+
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval-aviary1.0.8+
Comment on attachment 198850 [details] [diff] [review] patch v2 This patch isn't going to work for moz17/aviary101, is it? Not even with Blake's splitwindow alternative I don't think.
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval1.7.13?
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval1.7.13+
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval-aviary1.0.8?
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval-aviary1.0.8+
Whiteboard: [sg:high] xss → [sg:high] xss splitwindows?
mrbkap says his split-windows alternative does in fact fix this. QA-wanted.
Fixed on the aviary1.0/mozilla1.7 branches by the split-window alternative (bug 316589)
Comment on attachment 198850 [details] [diff] [review] patch v2 Don't need this on old branches with the split-windows alternative fix.
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval1.7.13?
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval1.7.13-
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval-aviary1.0.8?
Attachment #198850 - Flags: approval-aviary1.0.8-
verified with: Windows: Moz - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.13) Gecko/20060215 Fx - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.13) Gecko/20060215 Firefox/1.0.8 Macintosh: Moz - Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U;PPC Mac OS X Mach-O; en-US; rv:1.7.13) Gecko/20060215 Firefox/1.0.8 Fx - Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U;PPC Mac OS X Mach-O; en-US; rv:1.7.13) Gecko/20060215 Firefox/1.0.8 Linux Moz - Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U;Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.7.13) Gecko/20060215
Status: RESOLVED → VERIFIED
Group: security
Flags: in-testsuite+ → in-testsuite?
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