Closed
Bug 947572
Opened 11 years ago
Closed 10 years ago
client destroys session ticket in cache when it receives a NewSessionTicket message with an empty ticket
Categories
(NSS :: Libraries, defect, P2)
NSS
Libraries
Tracking
(firefox28 wontfix, firefox29 fixed, firefox30 fixed, firefox-esr24- fixed, b2g-v1.2 wontfix, b2g-v1.3 fixed, b2g-v1.3T fixed, b2g-v1.4 fixed, b2g-v2.0 fixed)
People
(Reporter: briansmith, Assigned: wtc)
References
Details
(Keywords: sec-other)
Attachments
(1 file, 1 obsolete file)
2.46 KB,
patch
|
wtc
:
checked-in+
|
Details | Diff | Splinter Review |
+++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #930857 +++ See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-3.3: "If the server determines that it does not want to include a ticket after it has included the SessionTicket extension in the ServerHello, then it sends a zero-length ticket in the NewSessionTicket handshake message." The client should continue using its existing ticket when it receives a NewSessionTicket message with an empty ticket--i.e. it should just ignore the NewSessionTicket message entirely. But, the current code replaces the ticket in the session with an empty one, destroying it with no replacement.
Reporter | ||
Updated•11 years ago
|
No longer blocks: CVE-2014-1490
Priority: P1 → --
Reporter | ||
Updated•11 years ago
|
Whiteboard: [introduced in bug 403563][briansmith is unsure about the security rating]
Reporter | ||
Comment 1•11 years ago
|
||
See the OpenSSL bug: http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2772
Comment 2•11 years ago
|
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This one should not have any security impact, unlike Bug #930857.
Assignee | ||
Comment 3•11 years ago
|
||
Brian: The following comment in ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket shows the current behavior may be intentional: 481 /* A server might have sent us an empty ticket, which has the 482 * effect of clearing the previously known ticket. 483 */ I think both the current behavior and your proposed change are reasonable. It should be easy to implement your proposed change. Why don't we take care of it as part of your patch for bug 930857?
Assignee | ||
Comment 4•11 years ago
|
||
I outlined how to fix this bug in bug 930857 comment 9
Reporter | ||
Comment 5•11 years ago
|
||
I agree that this bug on its own isn't security-sensitive but I don't want to draw more attention to the other security-sensitive bugs in the related code by making this bug public, yet. I do not want to fix this bug as part of bug 930857 because this is a separate issue, and because this bug has a much lower severity and lower priority. Additionally, it might be good to have one of the newer NSS contributors fix this bug so they can build experience working with NSS.
Keywords: sec-vector
Whiteboard: [good first bug][mentor=briansmith]
Comment 6•11 years ago
|
||
hidden "good first bug"s don't work very well.
Assignee | ||
Comment 7•11 years ago
|
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Brian: please mentor me to fix this bug.
Assignee: nobody → wtc
Status: NEW → ASSIGNED
Priority: -- → P2
Whiteboard: [good first bug][mentor=briansmith]
Target Milestone: --- → 3.15.5
Assignee | ||
Comment 8•11 years ago
|
||
Attachment #8350781 -
Flags: review?(brian)
Reporter | ||
Comment 10•10 years ago
|
||
Comment on attachment 8350781 [details] [diff] [review] Patch Review of attachment 8350781 [details] [diff] [review]: ----------------------------------------------------------------- ::: lib/ssl/sslnonce.c @@ +488,5 @@ > /*in/out*/ NewSessionTicket *newSessionTicket) > { > PORT_Assert(sid); > PORT_Assert(newSessionTicket); > + PORT_Assert(newSessionTicket->ticket.data); Should also PORT_Assert(newSessionTocket->ticket.len > 0);
Attachment #8350781 -
Flags: review?(brian) → review+
Assignee | ||
Comment 11•10 years ago
|
||
I added the assertion Brian suggested and checked this in: https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/f33acaba0f19
Attachment #8350781 -
Attachment is obsolete: true
Attachment #8384799 -
Flags: checked-in+
Assignee | ||
Updated•10 years ago
|
Status: ASSIGNED → RESOLVED
Closed: 10 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
Target Milestone: 3.15.5 → 3.16
Updated•10 years ago
|
Group: crypto-core-security
Comment 12•10 years ago
|
||
ESR24 isn't running NSS 3.15.5 so is affected by this still.
status-firefox28:
--- → fixed
status-firefox29:
--- → fixed
status-firefox30:
--- → fixed
status-firefox-esr24:
--- → affected
tracking-firefox-esr24:
--- → ?
Comment 13•10 years ago
|
||
Al - Does comment 12 mean that you think that we should take this bug on ESR24? Is it still correct to classify this bug as sec-other on ESR24?
Flags: needinfo?(abillings)
Comment 14•10 years ago
|
||
We can't take this bug on ESR24 unless we upgrade NSS on ESR24. This was rolled into NSS. I don't know that there are enough NSS changes overall for us to push for an NSS upgrade there. Dan?
Flags: needinfo?(abillings) → needinfo?(dveditz)
Comment 15•10 years ago
|
||
With the current information, this doesn't seem pressing enough to take on ESR. I'm going to mark as esr24- but will reconsider if there is supporting reasoning from the sec team.
Updated•10 years ago
|
status-b2g-v1.2:
--- → affected
status-b2g-v1.3:
--- → fixed
status-b2g-v1.3T:
--- → fixed
status-b2g-v1.4:
--- → fixed
status-b2g-v2.0:
--- → fixed
Updated•10 years ago
|
Updated•10 years ago
|
Comment 16•10 years ago
|
||
This didn't land until NSS 3.16, so B2G v1.3 (3.15.5) is still affected.
Assignee | ||
Comment 17•10 years ago
|
||
RyanVM: I think this bug is not a security issue. It is a performance issue. Brian: I think we should remove any security-sensitive flags on this bug now because all the known security issues in session ticket handling have been fixed. If you agree, could you do that? Thanks.
Comment 18•10 years ago
|
||
NSS was updated to version 3.16.2 across all supported branches in bug 1020695.
Updated•10 years ago
|
Flags: needinfo?(dveditz)
Updated•10 years ago
|
Group: core-security
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Description
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