2.55 KB, patch
Kathleen Brade: review+
Scott MacGregor: superreview+
|Details | Diff | Splinter Review|
796 bytes, patch
|Details | Diff | Splinter Review|
371 bytes, text/html
1.05 KB, patch
Radha on family leave (not reading bugmail): review+
rpotts (gone): superreview+
|Details | Diff | Splinter Review|
Mozilla should only add the automatic "www." and ".com" to urls when the user types the URL in, not when the user clicks a link such as http://mozilla/ . This is a potential security issue: suppose you have a computer named chameleon on your network and log into it through the web using http://chameleon/* . Someone manages to DoS chameleon and also gets ahold of the chameleon.com domain name. Next time you try to log into chameleon using your local copy of the login form, they get your password. Then they go to http://chameleon.network.net/ and log in using your password (unless chameleon is selective in which IPs it allows to log in).
Problem confirmed with 2000-04-06-10-M15 on WinNT. Adding firstname.lastname@example.org to Cc: list -- this does look like a security issue to me as well, and one that would not necessarily need so complicated a scenario to be problematic. While nobody else could reproduce the problem, bug 17657 reports a problem where only the "www." ".com" version was ever visited.
good catch. ->travis
Should be fixed now...
2000 042112, and still happens. Reopening.
This works correctly with 20000524 win32/linux/mac builds. Clicking on a link (e.g., http://blues/ ) takes the browser to the local domain host 'blues'. Putting back fixed.
reopening (build 2000 060820 win98) http://mozilla/ takes me to http://www.mozilla.com/ . http://blues/ takes me to http://www.blues.com/, which redirects to another page.
Similarly, a link to http://cmc.edu/ should fail but the same URL typed into the location bar should work.
And another one: file:///foo/bar/ -> file://///foo/bar/ , which is making bug 38643 (a win9x crasher) happen more often than it would otherwise.
Adding a dependency on bug 60768 which deals with moving the fixup code into a separate service.
Ccing mstoltz and nominating for nsbeta1. Bug 65421 might be a dup.
Jesse's attack scenario is a bit implausible - an attacker would need to a) know the name of a machine on your intranet that might contain interesting information, and b) own the equivalent domain name in .com. Can anyone come up with a more plausible scenario? Maybe we should have a pref for "assume www.*.com" or "never assume."
Ok, maybe it's not that big of a security hole. It's still a bug though. I don't think a pref is needed: this type of URL correction should never happen on links (or form submission, or going to a bookmark), and if you type the URL into the location bar you're likely to notice when it changes.
The W3C thinks there *should* be a pref for turning off www. / .com guessing for URLs typed into the location bar (I said in my previous comment that I didn't think a pref would be necessary). http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/NOTE-cuap-20010206#cp-keyword 1.6 Allow the user to override any mechanism for guessing URIs or keywords. Many user agents compensate for incomplete URIs by applying a series of transformations with the hope of creating a URI that works. For example, many user agents transform the string www.w3.org into the URI http://www.w3.org/. The user should be able to control whether, for example, typing a keyword should invoke a Web search or whether the user agent should prepend http://www. and append .org/.
The W3C CUAP's suggestion of having a pref to always turn url-fixing off is now bug 68407.
bug 65421 should be added to the list of bugs that this blocks. I saw this when I clicked a link to "http://primates/~vladimir" on slashdot. Someone from ximian had erroneously posted an internal URL. When I clicked the link, I got to a netscape search on "primates." I thought this was someone's idea of a practical joke, but when I looked back at the link, I found it was this bug... FYI I have internet keywords turned on.
A link like http:/cgi-bin/man2html?locate+1l (note the single '/' after 'http:') should be interpreted as relative to the hostname in the URL of the page. Example: I'm reading http://localhost/cgi-bin/man2html/usr/share/man/man1/xargs.1.gz and I click on the link above; Navigator4.76, lynx and w3m load http://localhost/cgi-bin/man2html?locate+1l, Mozilla (Build ID: 2001031005; Linux) loads http://www.cgi-bin.com/man2html?locate+1l if internet keywords are disabled, and http://search.netscape.com/cgi-bin/search?charset=UTF-8&search=cgi-bin if internet key are enabled. With this bug, man2html it's unusable with Mozilla, because it generates only reltive links!
This kind of relative urls is deprecated with rfc2396 and we decided to no longer support it.
Marcello, Andreas, isn't that what bug 65421 is exactly about?
Open Networking bugs, qa=tever -> qa to me.
re: Michael Its a security hole for two reasons: 1- Even if a domain is not actively using a web server @ www.<hostname>.com, a wildcard DNS record could be used to send all web requests somewhere. 2- Anytime this goes out some place to the wrong machine, it could carry information in the URL to a remote site. (This is the same reason I object to the internet kewords feature being hooked up as a secondary handler between hostname resolution and posting DNS errors...)
Good points, Ben. Necko-level security needs a serious look in general. If your last comment was directed at me, the name is Mitchell, not Michael.
sorry. too many bugs, not enough sleep...
As of build 2001061404 win32 installer sea trunk this seems to be fixed except that Mozilla doesn't give any error messages for invalid links.
Since DNS cache is not going to support negative entries, fixing this would do a lot for overall DNS performance in real-world situations. There is also and RFE for even more liberalized hostname -> Top Level Domain searching (bug 37867), and I think that would worsen the problem further, so I'm blocking that bug with this bug.
> Jesse's attack scenario is a bit implausible - an attacker would need to a) > know the name of a machine on your intranet that might contain interesting > information, and b) own the equivalent domain name in .com. Can anyone come up > with a more plausible scenario? Given that many "words" under .com are already registered and hooked up, it is not unlikely that there will be a corresponding <http://www.jazz.com> for your internal <http://jazz/>. So, if you try to log into an internal server and it happens to be down, your login information might leak into the public internet to a "random" site. Such a case could appear accidently, without any "attacker", nevertheless confidental information has been revealed. Note: I am behind a Squid proxy and I don't see this bug with 0.9.1.
reseting owner to defaul
Why does Mozilla try to add "www."? Why does it need to? Wouldn't the easiest way to fix this simply be to disable the www-adding? Personally I find the automatic www-thing very annoying. If a machine in a local network called 'whatever' is down, why would I want Mozilla to try www.whatever.com? It's a waste of bandwith, and almost all important sites work without www. anyway.
*** Bug 115539 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
Will fixing bug 115539 also fix this?
auto adding www. or .com is plain weird. Btw we're not all in a .com world. What about .org, .net, .dk, .info... etc
related to 115539
*** Bug 115539 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
The www. & .com appending should be a pref but I don't see it as a security issue. The code in nsDefaultURIFixup::MakeAlternateURI doesn't do anything if the URL contains user or password information.
Uh, not a security issue? debian.org => www.debian.org.com -- ok it's just Debian but it could be something you don't want people to know internalserver => www.internalserver.com -- this one should never leave the internal network, but instead it goes straight to the external DNS servers. With a bit of luck (hah), internalserver.com is owned by someone you don't like. And now they know an URL within your internal network. I'm sure more creative people could think of even better examples. Look up the jargon file entry for DWIM to see why guessing and acting on behalf of the user based on that guessing is Evil and Rude.
Security: also consider the typo www.creditcardcom (missing dot) Mozilla will expand this to www.creditcardcom.com. Now imagine if this exists and is a lookalike for the creditcard site. You could easily give it personal information before you noticed. Badness. Lest this seems far fetched I know for a fact that at least one famous site has a framing and linking copycat site which does exactly this. See my comments for bug 125871. To me, this means that mozilla should NEVER mangle a url, whether typed in or from a clicked link. Cesar's comments about DWIM are spot on.
I do see this as a security issue (spoofing), and we can argue as to the severity, and risk vs. the inconvenience of removing this feature that people ahve come to expect. The URL bar is generally permissive of a wide range of input errors. Any thoughts on the security/functionality tradeoff here?
The only thing I've come to expect is the automatic prepending of http:// . That's a huge time saver. I believe lots of people here agree with me. Adding www. and .com only sometimes (depending on the particular relative timings of the DNS servers, the resolver timeout, and the phase of the moon) violates the principle of least susprise. Like when I (on lynx) tried to load "testing.debian.org" and got a default Debian Apache page -- only to find out after chatting with the Debian developers that it had misautoguessed something like "www.testing.debian.org.org". Which some kind soul set up to point to 127.0.0.1. I was seeing a page on my own box -- something I would not expect. Of course, now I have disabled it on lynx.cfg...
I'm convinced. There have been several dupes showing porn sites which take advantage of this. I'm for fixing this, but I will try to get some more opinions around here.
To clarify the current behaviour: if there are no dots in the name (e.g. foo) return www.foo.com else if there is one dot in the name if it starts with www. (e.g. www.foo) return www.foo.com else (e.g. foo.org) return www.foo.org else do nothing So debian.org should become www.debian.org (assuming debian.org doesn't exist) I can add a pref e.g. "fixup.alternate" plus prefs for the strings to stick on the front and the back.
Just get rid of it.
Created attachment 70713 [details] [diff] [review] Patch Patch makes fixup configurable via prefs. The UI for this & default prefs can be determined in another patch.
If bug 115539 is going to remain a duplicate of this one, then this bug's summary should be updated to include typed URLs, in addition to links. Otherwise, 115539 should remain a separate bug.
+nsbeta1 - I'm dogfooding on this bug now. #47 - I've separated the two bugs by reopening the dupe... I've modified the summary to make more sense, and use the term "domain guessing" for this behavior that seems to have no name... Location is user input, which is a legitimate area for some type of shortcut and domain guessing behavior (w/ a dozen or so good bugs filed against it). We don't do this for https: apparently (a from the patch's code snippet says:) // Code only works for http. Not for any other protocol including https! Domain guessing in links is really bad because you don't know what the author's intent was. I just spent all night sending requests to www.<SERVER>.com, because I clicked on links that had hostnames. This revealed a bunch of URI's to whoever is running those systems. The authors will go unnamed, but they should be very glad they didn't have URL's like "http://server/project/januaryshipdates.html". I think it is important to understand what the level of confusion involved here. I understand that this person understands their system is named "system", so they make links like "http://system/" and think their work is done. However, this person has already ignored several messages from me to literalize just what he mean to point to with his links, I think this is reasonable proof that another netscape employee should fix this problem for that person's sake. Also, you get situations like an email message that actually had a link that said: "my server is HERE" (with http://server.mcom.com as the HREF), but then also puts at the bottom of the message "http://server.mcom.com" (with the HREF of http://server/) !!! Fixing this would easily minimize the security leaks some publishers inflict upon themselves, as well as save users the frustration of staring at the throbber as DNS tries to find something that matches one of the incorrect guesses. 4xp does this, but I think we should override the legacy behavior for better security. Expanding localhost is another example of where we have problems. --- The only form of hostname -> expanded domain I think is reasonable is bug 88217, because that actually reflects a user's attempt to make these things go away. Also, the debian examples might be partially explained by bug 40082, which depends on bug 124565.
Adam, I didn't fully scan through benc's comments but if I'm reading it correctly it sounds like he has some concerns with the behavior with this patch. Is that right, if so can you address those? If not, email me again for a super review and I'll take a look at the patch.
Uhm, what's holding back the patch?
I'll resubmit the patch for sr. I know it doesn't address all the issues raised by this bug so I won't close the bug. But the patch will allow people to disable the feature entirely if they want for time being.
Comment on attachment 70713 [details] [diff] [review] Patch Do we already have default pref values for: "browser.fixup.alternate.enabled" and "browser.fixup.alternate.prefix" and "browser.fixup.alternate.suffix" If not, can we add defaults? everything else looks good. sr=mscott
Created attachment 75410 [details] [diff] [review] Pref diff Changes to all.js to add defaults for these prefs.
Comment on attachment 70713 [details] [diff] [review] Patch a=asa (on behalf of drivers) for checkin to the 1.0 trunk
> +pref("browser.fixup.alternate.enabled", true); Shouldn't this be +pref("browser.fixup.alternate.enabled", false); instead?
First patch is checked in. The prefs mean the behaviour is the same as before but at least you can disable it now. Next patch will address how best to do fixup such that URIs in the address bar are fixed up if loading fails but no link clicks.
> The prefs mean the behaviour is the same as before > but at least you can disable it now. That's what the prefs mean, yes, but why do you want it to be enabled by default? I strongly believe this should default to disabled, at the very least until bug 66183 is fixed.
I also strongly agree that the default should be off. Read the above comments especially those mentioning security concerns. It's also hard to see where this "feature" would help anyone these days, with the proliferation of non .com urls. It's more likely to baffle than help, especially relative internet newbies.
Someone file a new bug and provide the relevant one-line patch to have it turned off by default. Then, we can have the debate. Gerv
Oops... this is still open. Still, I think a new bug might be better. One bug, one issue. Gerv
I've reopened bug 115539 to debate whether browser.fixup.alternate.enabled should be true or false by default.
Created attachment 76004 [details] [diff] [review] Patch disables fixup on link click Fix turns out to be straightforward - only do fixup for LOAD_NORMAL loadtypes. Don't do fixup for any other type, e.g. LOAD_LINK. Reviews please.
I did a quick LXR search <http://lxr.mozilla.org/seamonkey/search?string=LOAD_NORMAL> and it seems that LODA_NORMAL is used in other cases than the urlbar, i.e. for image loading. It should only *ever* happen in the urlbar, everything else is a bug (possibly security-relevant).
The LOAD_NORMAL I'm testing for is a docshell flag. Are you sure you're not confusing it with nsIRequest::LOAD_NORMAL?
No, I'm not sure.
LOAD_NORMAL is a combination of flags for the docshell and has nothing to do with the LOAD_NORMAL flag on the nsIRequest interface. By adding this test I am able to restrict URI fixup to normal docshell load on a document which means fixup will not happen on pages loaded from cache, from history, from a link click and various other combinations. Inline content such as images, css, iframes etc should not be fixed up either. I will attach a testcase to demonstrate.
Created attachment 76054 [details] Test case Some HTML with some duff links that shouldn't be fixed once the patch is applied.
Created attachment 76059 [details] [diff] [review] Updated patch to disable fixup on link click Updated patch handles frames & iframes too
qa to me.
r=radha (after conferring with Adam)
*** Bug 133056 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
Comment on attachment 76059 [details] [diff] [review] Updated patch to disable fixup on link click email@example.com
Comment on attachment 76059 [details] [diff] [review] Updated patch to disable fixup on link click a=asa (on behalf of drivers) for checkin to the 1.0 trunk
Requesting adt1.0.0+. Risk summary - low. Patch is self contained and reasonably obvious. It suppresses www. & .com fixup for link clicks & subframes.
adt1.0.0+ (on ADT's behalf) for checkin into 1.0.
Fix is checked in.
The idea test for this would check every URL entry point, the full list of which I do not have in my head. Does anyone have the HTML expertise to tell me if there are additional tags besides what is covered in the testcase? TIA.
benc: for a list of URL entry points (?) that often misbehave, skim bug 55237 and bug 69070 (at least bug 55237 comment 0 and bug 69070 comment 24). I'd also test frames, iframes, "view image" (context menu), "save link target as", and "open link in new window". If you're bored, test all of those for referrer and checkloaduri as well :)
VERIFIED: Linux 2002-04-09-08 MacOSX 2002-04-10-08 Win32 200-04-09-03 jruderman: yikes. that's a lot of stuff. I took QA of the Domain guessing bug because they are related to DNS. I'm not going to (at this time) hunt around all the places people call Necko for URLs and figure this out. I should note that Open Tab and Open New Window seem to have inconsistent DNS error handling/Domain Guessing behaviors as well.
Was this fixed on the 1.0 branch? If yes, then pls mark this bug as fixed1.0.0, so QA can verify the fix.
This looks like it was fixed pre-branch, based on my comments. However, at least one person has reported a regression: bug 147119.
*** Bug 65421 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
As in comment #5 Try this: click on this link http://blues/ then middle-click on the link again. If you midle-click, the host blues is tryied, and then www.blues.com is tryied. I don't know if the midle-click issue goes in this bug too. It seems that the midle-click ends up here: http://lxr.mozilla.org/mozilla1.0/source/docshell/base/nsDefaultURIFixup.cpp#208 I have setup the midle-click to open the link in a new tab in the background. Used: Mozilla 1.0.1 RC1 on WinXP
Oliver: see bug 159742, "URI fixup happens after 'open link in new window' as if the address was typed by hand".
Thanks Jesse, I'm going to bug #159742 since this bug is closed.
*** Bug 31335 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
Why is the status of this bug "VERIFIED FIXED"? The issue is alive and Bug 159742 is still "NEW".